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Environmental shocks, particularly high impact natural disasters, such as earth-
quakes, floods and droughts, test the boundaries of social resilience and vulnerability.
According to the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT), from 1975-2011 the
number of natural disasters reported worldwide, along with the number of house-
holds affected, gradually increased over this period (Natural Disaster Trends, Cen-
ter for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)). Economic status of a
country did not predict the number of disasters a country faced. However, findings
indicate that countries with lower incomes (Kahn (2005), Stromberg (2007), Keefer
et al. (2011)) and countries with greater income inequality (Anbarci et al. (2005))
encounter more casualties and greater economic damage. It is therefore important to
understand ways in which communities in lower income countries can cope with such
community level shocks, as this can then point to changes that can be made to help
these countries better cope with environmental shocks.
This dissertation is comprised of three applied essays focusing on identifying con-
sequences of environmental shocks related to social protection, migration and labor in
developing countries. Recent literature on environmental shocks in low-income coun-
tries have focused on improving the measurement of such shocks to avoid common
identification issues. The essays in this dissertation provide empirical and method-
ological contributions to a growing literature on measuring and understanding the
implications of environmental shocks.
In the first essay I address a gap in the current analytical literature on the effective-
ness of decentralized targeting of social safety nets (often delivered in the same way
as humanitarian aid) in insuring households against disaster risk. I combine survey
data from Indonesia with geological earthquake data to determine if village leaders
change the pattern of distribution of a subsidized rice program intended for the poor
in earthquake affected villages. My findings suggest that the central government tar-
gets more safety net resources to earthquake villages, but access to these resources
declines for its intended poorest beneficiaries, and targeting is worse in communities
with higher social capital. I discuss how these findings may be linked to bargain-
ing power assigned by village leaders to poor and non-poor recipients, which can be
a function of the leader’s personal benefit, either electorally or through reciprocity
expected from social contacts or family members to whom the leader provides access.
The second essay examines migration as a key mode of adaptation to extreme
floods and droughts, and investigates the impact of weather-driven internal migration
on local labor markets in Nepal. In this essay the identification and methodology used
by Boustan et al. (2010) is modified to a dynamic framework to fit the contextual
setting of the study. We combine survey data from Nepal with 0.5x0.5 degree gridded
satellite based weather data to identify weather anomalies and then create instruments
for local migration in Nepal. Our analysis of the impacts of local migration on labor
markets finds native wage losses are slightly larger than those observed in the U.S.
and elsewhere. Labor substitution is imperfect in Nepal, as migrants appear more
skilled than the average native worker in hosting communities. These results suggest
imperfect substitution coupled with fixed labor demand in the formal sector may
partially explain why wage losses are more pronounced here than in other settings.
We also find strong negative effects of migration on wages of low-skilled workers and
informal sector employment. This is consistent with a displacement of low-skilled
workers out of the labor markets. Highly skilled migrants may have to accept lower-
skilled jobs to integrate into the labor markets and therefore, push low-skilled natives
out of the labor markets.
The third essay identifies the detrimental impacts of crop shocks, predominantly
floods and droughts, on secondary school aged youth (aged 14 to 19) in Tanzania.
While a large body of literature has focused on the causes and consequences of child
(aged 7 to 13) labor very little is known about the impact of transitory shocks on
youth. I find that crop shocks may increase youth labor significantly, and be partic-
ularly detrimental to school attendance of youth enrolled in school. Youth enrolled
in school increase unpaid labor to substitute for the paid labor taken up by others in
the household. These results also indicate that female youth are disproportionately
more likely to engage in unpaid labor and miss school compared to male youth. I also
identify that while youth schooling outcomes are affected by shocks, child schooling
is not affected. These research findings suggest that more attention needs to be paid
to short and long term consequences of shocks for youth.
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Chapter 1: Can Natural Disasters Affect Decentralized Targeting of
Social Safety Nets Intended For the Poor?: Evidence from
Earthquakes in Indonesia
Abstract
Natural disaster shocks are highly destructive in underdeveloped countries. Social
safety nets may be particularly important in the face of such shocks for insuring
households. This paper examines the targeting of a rice subsidy program (RASKIN)
with decentralized village level targeting, in the aftermath of earthquakes in Indone-
sia. I find earthquake affected villages benefit more from RASKIN. However, access of
the poorest is nearly 12% lower relative to such households in unaffected areas in the
post earthquake period. The non-poor in earthquake affected villages are more likely
to participate by 6% to 13% relative to the poorest. While the non-poor face larger
relative losses than the poor during an earthquake, both consumption and assets of
the non-poor remain above the poor in absolute terms. I also explore heterogenous
effects of earthquake shocks on safety net targeting by village social capital. It is
widely believed that social capital is associated with better governance. However, in
this case, higher pre-disaster social capital does not increase access of the poorest
to RASKIN. The results of this paper suggest that decentralized targeting of social
insurance may not be effective at reaching intended beneficiaries in the context of
natural disasters.
JEL Classification: Q54; I38; D63




Large scale disasters create a problem of asymmetric information in which identifying
and targeting aid or social safety net resources towards households in need can be
challenging. Nonetheless, it is important to understand how decision makers, such as
village leaders, target resources in the aftermath of a crisis. In this paper I focus on
the targeting of social safety net resources within villages impacted by earthquakes
in Indonesia. Such safety net programs may exist within villages prior to disasters,
and can be adopted to address changes household needs arising from disaster shocks
(Pritchett et al. (2002),de Janvry et al. (2006), Pelham et al. (2011)).
Examining Indonesia’s largest subsidized rice for poor safety net program, I first
question if the central government uses the program as a coping mechanism to allocate
more resources to disaster affected villages. Second, I examine if resources distributed
within villages by village authorities are diverted away from the program’s intended
poor beneficiaries1. To fully explain the observed resource distribution pattern I test
whether targeting of safety net resources is linked to the impact of earthquakes on
households consumption and asset losses. Lastly, I consider heterogenous impacts
of earthquake shocks on the distribution of safety net resources by the level of pre-
disaster social capital within villages.
By addressing these questions I aim to fill a gap in the existing literature on the
effectiveness of social safety nets or humanitarian aid in insuring households, mostly
the poor, against disaster risk. There are a few studies that examine related issues.
de Janvry et al. (2006) consider the role of Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program
as a safety net in affecting child schooling and labor post shocks. Morris and Wodon
(2003) analyze the targeting mechanisms of disaster relief funds post hurricane Mitch
1The response to this question has implications not just for the distribution of decentralized safety
net resources but also for distribution of post-disaster humanitarian aid,distributed in a similar way.
de Silva (2009) and Aldrich (2010) discuss inequality in the distribution of aid post Tsunami in Sri
Lanka and India, by ethnicity, caste, location, and bridging social capital.
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in Honduras. Looking at allocation rules they find that the allocation of relief does
not depend on household wealth, but is dependent on the amount of asset losses
incurred by a household.
With the exception of these studies that look specifically at the distribution of
aid or safety net resources, the literature on natural disasters has largely focused
on the effects on child health and human capital investment (Bustelo et al. (2012),
Ferreira and Schady (2009), Jensen (2000a) for a literature review), labor market con-
sequences (Jayachandran (2006), Lopamudra (2007), Mueller and Quisumbing (2010)),
and the impact on poverty and growth (Rasmussen (2004), Skidmore and Toya (2002),
Jaramillo (2009), Raddatz (2007), 2007; Baez and Santos (2008), Rosemberg et al.
(2008)). Most such studies on poverty and growth find persistent negative impacts
of disasters on household poverty. Other studies have examined coping strategies
during disasters, showing that households lacking access to formal insurance rely
on own asset stocks, including grain and livestock (Paxson (1992), Udry (1995),
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)), liquid assets such as jewelry and financial savings
(Franeknberg et al. (2003)), and social networks, but such insurance is not complete
(Townsend (1994), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)).
While there is a clear lack of empirical evidence measuring the impact of dis-
asters on the distribution of social safety net resources, there are several reasons
why a natural disaster might affect this inter- and intra-village distribution. First,
disasters prompt changes in the identity of those in need and exacerbates the im-
perfect information problem on the relative degree of need. Second, increased need
and decreased resources within the village can increase competition for safety net
benefits. Given the limited capacity of central governments to identify need, decen-
tralized targeting in which village leaders determine household access to a safety net
program may be more efficient. However, post-disaster, village authorities may face
competing demands from the needy poor who are the intended targets of safety nets,
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from the elite, who face larger absolute losses, and from those to which they have
social ties or who belong to important voting blocs. The latter two groups are likely
to overlap, posing a threat to the former. Nose (2010) finds disasters may exacer-
bate underlying economic bias and corruption in the distribution of resources if the
number of households in need increases. Hence, disasters could exacerbate the prob-
lem of elite capture2 discussed in the literature (Mansuri and Rao (2004), Platteau
(2004), Platteau and Gaspart (2003), Baland and Platteau (1999), Bardhan (2002),
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), Vedled (2000)).
The current literature also does not examine the role of social capital in post disas-
ter aid distribution. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as “features of social organi-
zation, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society
by facilitating coordinated actions.” There is a large literature addressing whether
social capital matters in issues ranging from governance to growth, to human capital
accumulation and child welfare (Olken (2009a), Dipasquale (1999), Knack and Philip
(1997), Narayan and Pritchett (2000)). However, the role of social capital in reducing
the influence of elite capture during community level shocks has not been explored.
Putnam (1993)’s seminal work on social capital suggested that declining social capital
within communities could lead to ineffective governance. Stronger village networks,
on the other hand, could increase the capacity of communities to respond collectively
to shocks (Douty (1972)).
During disasters, higher levels of social capital may thus be expected to improve
2Elite capture refers to the capture of resources by groups with greater social and economic power,
such as wealthier households, landowners, those with access to formal financial savings mechanisms.
Studies on elite capture focus on Community Driven Development (CDD) programs in which resource
allocation is determined at the village level. The problem of elite capture has been pervasive in var-
ious economic arenas, from the distribution of formal subsidized credit (Burgess and Pande (2005)),
to the distribution of input vouchers in agricultural subsidy programs (Pan and Christiaensen
(2012)), to the management of benefits generated from local hardwood forests (Iversen et al. (2006)).
Several critiques of such programs can be found in the literature (Mansuri and Rao (2004), Platteau
(2004), Platteau and Gaspart (2003)) suggesting that lack of proper implementation and oversight
can lead to elite capture. Fritzen (2007) analyzes the design of CDD programs in Indonesia and
finds that elite control of project decision-making is pervasive.
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decentralized targeting of social safety net resources. However, higher social capital
within a village may disadvantage the poor if that social capital is concentrated among
the elite. Social capital is difficult to quantify but governments may use some proxy
of it to figure out how it helps communities distribute resources. I use standard
measures of pre-earthquake participation3 in community meetings and the number of
social groups found within a village to test how this affects the distribution of social
safety net resources.
I analyze these questions using data from Indonesia (Indonesia Family Life Sur-
vey (IFLS)) because of the existence of large-scale social safety net programs, and the
country’s susceptibility to disasters, particularly earthquakes. The study uses panel
survey data from 2000 (IFLS3) and 2008 (IFLS4). I consider a large-scale subsidized
rice for poor program (RASKIN) in Indonesia designed to provide rice at a price
significantly below the market price to poor households. According to Sumarto et al.
(2002) need and therefore participation should be determined using specified ob-
jective criteria including household consumption, landlessness, asset ownership and
other criteria on the household and its members. However, evidence suggests that
participation is not always determined objectively.
Although the government mandates using nationally set poverty standards as a
guideline for determining RASKIN program eligibility, several studies (Pritchett et al.
(2002), Olken et al. (2001)) find that local authorities wield power over which house-
holds access the program and their level of benefits. In the RASKIN program, the
central government distributes subsidized rice from warehouses to the local authori-
ties that transport the rice to the village. Subsequently, village authorities determine
eligibility, as well as the price of rice and a quantity cap for each household. I found
significant inter- and intra- village variation in participation, price paid and quantity
purchased within RASKIN villages.
3The measures of social capital used are the same as those used by Olken (2009b) to measure
how television and radio affect social capital in Indonesian villages
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of In-
donesia’s ‘rice for poor’ (RASKIN) safety net program and the country’s exposure to
earthquakes. Section 3 is a description of the data sources and variable definitions.
Section 4 provides a conceptual framework. Section 5, 6 and 7 give empirical strategy,
empirical results and conclusion respectively.
1.2 Social Safety Net Programs and Earthquake Exposure in Indone-
sia
1.2.1 The Rice for Poor Social Safety Net Program: Inequality and
Insurance
During the Asian Financial Crisis from 1997-1999 the number of households living
below the poverty line in Indonesia increased dramatically (Tabor and Sawit (2001),
Sumarto et al. (2002)). This lead to the creation of several safety net programs. The
largest among these was the OPK - Operasi Pasar Khusus - rice program created in
mid 1998 (later called RASKIN), as a result of soaring rice prices, food shortages,
malnutrition and a decline in real household income. Rice is a staple consumed by
most Indonesian households and therefore RASKIN, which ensured the affordability
of rice for the poor, was a critical component of these safety net programs. The
program is the largest redistributive program in the country.
For RASKIN the rice was distributed through village government authorities. On
a monthly basis, the government logistics depot (DOLOG) delivered rice to the vil-
lage, or village staff would retrieve the rice from the subdistrict (Kecamatan) office.
According to the RASKIN food security program’s guidelines, each eligible household
determined to be below a poverty threshold within a village should be allowed to pur-
chase 10kg of subsidized rice per month at a price of Rupiah 1000/kg (Sumarto et al.
(2002)). Approximately half a year after the start of the program 74 million house-
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holds, 15 percent of the country, were targeted (Sumarto et al. (2002)). Olken (2006)
notes that during 1998-1999 official guidelines allowed households to purchase up to 20
kg of OPK rice per month at 60 percent below the market price. In survey data using
the 1998 Hundred Village Survey, a nationally representative survey of 100 villages,
he finds that the subsidy represented approximately 9 percent of total pre-program
monthly household expenditures for households purchasing the full allotment.
Although villages were supposed to determine eligibility following national BKKBN
(Population and Family Planning board) criteria, Olken et al. (2001) find that there
was significant inter-village variation in the determination of eligibility and therefore
whether or not poor households within a village qualified for the program. For ex-
ample, setting the price too high made some households unable to afford the rice.
In some villages, rice was distributed equally among all households, thereby reducing
the amount of rice poor households could have access to. In certain cases, Olken et
al. found that wealthier households lobbied to receive the rice despite not consuming
the rice, which was found to be of lower quality. Once they received it they were able
to benefit from the subsidy by re-selling it to traders. Accordingly, village authorities
had almost complete authority to determine how the rice would be distributed within
their villages (Olken et al. (2001)). A study by LP3ES (2000) on the OPK program in
1999 estimated that among households receiving subsidized rice, 19 percent received
the full 20kg, and 68 percent received less that 10kg.
1.2.2 Earthquake Exposure
Indonesia and the surrounding region is one of the most seismically active zones found
globally4. The 2004 Tsunami, the third largest earthquake in the world since 1900, is
a well-known example of an earthquake affecting Indonesia. While this claimed 227
898 casualties, most earthquakes have a small fraction of the impact of the Tsunami.
4USGS Seismotectonics of the Indonesian Region: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/
world/indonesia/seismotectonics.php
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Figure 1.1: Seismic Hazard Map of Indonesia Source: NEIC-USGS
Although most earthquakes are not as severe, a few high magnitude earthquakes, over
5.5 on the richter scale, occurred in Indonesia during the study period. Most notable
was the May 2006 Java earthquake in which human casualties were reported at 5,749,
and 38,568 people were injured with an estimated 423,000 evacuated (USGS). Figure
2, above, depicts a seismic hazard map of Indonesia showing the the probabilistic
maximum considered earthquake given the relative motion of different areas.
Figure 3, shows earthquake occurrences between the years 1988 and 2008 of mag-
nitude above 5 at epicenter. The red vectors illustrates the movement of the Australia
plate relative to the Sunda Plate. The green circles indicate fatal earthquakes and all
colored circles represent earthquakes with main shocks over magnitude 7.7 and after-
shocks occurring within 31 days. The different colors represent different earthquakes.
I spatially link US Geological Survey (USGS) data on earthquake occurrences
to communities found in the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data set. I use a
difference in difference framework to identify the impact of earthquakes occurring over
a period of two years prior to the 2008 survey, while treating 2000 as the pre-disaster
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Figure 1.2: Indonesia Earthquakes 1988-2008 Source: NEIC-USGS
9
Figure 1.3: Source: author’s calculations using NEIC-USGS
period. This is because several of the country’s most catastrophic historic earthquakes
occurred during this period and few villages were affected by catastrophic shocks in
the 25 years prior to 2000. Using U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) magnitude and
distance to epicenter data, the number of villages exposed to catastrophic earthquakes
over 5.5 magnitude, and within 25 km of the community, over the period 1975 to
2008, is shown in Figure 1, below. I use a narrow definition of shocks to ensure that
only extreme events are recorded. In the 2006-07 period, 33 IFLS communities were
affected by a catastrophic shock using this criteria for extreme shocks5.
Several papers find that the impact of earthquakes on households are strongly
negative in the short run and likely to persist in the long run. Baez and Santos (2008)
and Rosemberg et al. (2008) show that in the short run households impacted by severe
earthquakes earn less income, consume less and draw down assets significantly. These
studies suggest that recovery from asset losses would take several years. Given such
5From USGS documentation most catastrophic earthquakes in Indonesia were over 5.5 magnitude.
Varying distance to epicenter up approximately 50 km does not alter the observed pattern of village
exposure to shocks. Figures in the appendix show exposure to shocks within 25-50 km, 50-75 km
and 75-100 km radius of communities
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findings, I concentrate on earthquakes within two years of the 2008 survey because
the negative impacts on household consumption and savings remain large over this
period. Figure 1 shows that several communities were exposed to a shock in 2001.
However, most communities were from one area, Yogyakarta, and newspaper coverage
(Jakarta Post, 2001) suggests no significant damage was caused during this shock. In
the analysis I control for community exposure to shocks in the 2000-2005 period
and 1975-1999 period to control for the impact of past exposure to earthquakes and
changes in behavior arising from changes in households expectations.
For the empirical analysis in this paper I focus on communities located along the
islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali and West Nusa Tengarra sampled by the Indonesia
Family Life Survey (IFLS). These areas serves as an ideal setting as they lie along
a tectonic fault and are therefore more prone to earthquakes, and contain the most
densely populated areas in Indonesia. Both South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi
are excluded as geological survey data indicate no seismic activity in these areas
during the time period of interest. Keeping the comparison within the indicated
regions allows for the creation of a control group with similar characteristics as the
earthquake affected population.
1.3 Data
The primary data for this paper comes from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (ILFS)
which is a large scale longitudinal survey carried out in 13 of 27 provinces in Indonesia
representing 83% of the Indoneisan population. The survey was first carried out in
1993/94 (IFLS1), followed by subsequent surveys in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998 (IFLS2+),
2000 (FILS3) and 2008 (IFLS4). For the purpose of this paper I will use data from
the individual, household and community surveys for the 2000 and 2008 surveys6.
6IFLS2, carried out from August 1997 to April 1998, is used to verify that for outcomes on
consumption and assets, treated and untreated households in the matched sample follow a similar
pre-disaster trend. IFLS2 does not have data on RASKIN. IFLS1 is not used as it dates too far
11
The availability of panel data in these survey periods allows a study of the dynam-
ics of behavior. Among provinces being studied in this paper, the sample included
6728 IFLS3 households. In IFLS4, the re-contact rate was 95.1% of any part of IFLS3
origin households, over eight years later. This is a relatively low rate of attrition for
a large survey. Overall 6329 households, 87.6% of all households were interviewed
in all 4 surveys since IFLS1 (IFLS User Guide, 2009). The higher re-interview rates
would lessen the risk of bias due to nonrandom attrition in the survey. For households
surveyed in 2000 living in communities affected by a disaster in 2006 and 2007, the
rate of attrition in 2008 is 4.29%, 31/723 . Similarly, attrition among households
livings in communities unaffected by a disaster is 5.00%, 331/6728. A ttest reveals
no difference in mean attrition among potentially affected and unaffected households
in 2000, surveyed in 2008 surveys.
For the study I focus on origin households from 2000, present in 2008. Although
earthquakes are exogenous states of nature, location is not strictly randomly deter-
mined due to the two year period over which earthquake occurrences are measured.
It is possible that village and household characteristics are correlated with risk if
such risk is correlated over time, or if households affected in the 2006-2007 somehow
differed from unaffected households.
Appendix Table A1. shows differences across households in the earthquake af-
fected and unaffected areas. For the unmatched sample, earthquake affected house-
hold heads were significantly older, with more years of schooling and fractionally
longer residence in the village. Households in earthquake affected villages are also
disproportionately more urban, have better access to electricity and piped water,
have more water needs met in the dry season and have more midwives in the village.
These differences are all significant across affected and unaffected villages, and could
back, and would have a smaller sample to select from if treated as baseline, as split households are
also included in subsequent surveys. IFLS2+ in 1998 was only carried out on a 25 percent sample
and is thus excluded from the study
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potentially affect the outcomes of interest. Some of the consumption outcomes are
also significantly different across the two groups. Hence, to empirically determine the
causal impact of exposure to earthquakes on household welfare and the effectiveness of
social safety net programs, a difference-in-difference estimation along with matching
is used.
To mitigate ex-ante differences, across treated and untreated households, I Propen-
sity Score Match (PSM) households in the sample to create balance along baseline
characteristics. The sample is well suited to PSM as there is a sufficiently large control
sample from which matches can be drawn. Origin households in 2000, also present in
2008, are used to create a matched sample. Among a total of 723 households in the
earthquake affected treatment group, 570 are included in the matched sample. The
treatment group is matched to a control sample of 1,170 households, totaling 1,740
households in the sample each survey year. In total the sample included 33 com-
munities affected by at least one earthquake over the period 2006 to 2007 and 250
unaffected communities. The matched sample included 30 affected and 215 unaffected
communities.
Summary statistics and differences in means at the 2000 baseline for the matched
sample are shown in the right panel of Table A1 As shown in the statistics, house-
hold characteristics are balanced across the affected and unaffected matched sample.
Household heads are on average 49 years old, with 6.25 years of schooling at the
mean. Households have roughly 5.85 members and a household is established within
a village on average for 45 years. One concern that arises from analyzing disasters is
that such extreme events could increase migration in or out of disaster areas, leading
to a bias in estimates on the impact of earthquakes. As discussed above, there is no
statistically significant difference in attrition across survey years, between earthquake
affected areas and unaffected areas. In addition, the matched sample ensures, that
households have been present in an area for approximately the same amount of time,
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and have similar characteristics. Approximately 54% to 55% of households are urban,
and all other characteristics including access to electricity, water, health posts bal-
ance across earthquake affected and unaffected communities. For the matched sample,
in 2000 43.2% of unaffected and 44.5% of affected households were participating in
the RASKIN program. There is no difference between treated and untreated house-
holds in total per capita consumption, food consumption, non food consumption and
durables purchases as shown by the p values for the differences. In addition, there is
no difference across the value of household assets and land ownership which are also
outcomes variables.
The second source of data is from the National Earthquake Information Center,
US Geological Survey (USGS) which provides historical information on magnitude,
depth, latitudinal and longitudinal epicenter information for earthquakes. Using a
rectangular latitude, longitude area search around Indonesia7 I located all earthquakes
with magnitude greater than 5.5 on a Richter scale in 2006 and 2007. This resulted
in information on over 200 such earthquake occurrences in this area over the two
year period. For each of these the distance from each community to the epicenter
was spatially linked using Vincenty’s Formula (Vincenty (1975)). For any year, a
community level earthquake occurrence was recorded if a shock was over magnitude
5.5 within spherical distance less than or equal to 25 km from epicenter to community.
While shocks of magnitude 5 and below occur quite frequently in Indonesia, these
are shown historically to not have any impact on communities (USGS, historical
earthquake information). I select a radius of 25km to closely link communities in
sub-districts (Kecamatan) that were reported to be affected by earthquakes in the
2006-2007 using reports on identified earthquakes 8.
7This covered an area from and 11.5◦ S to 6.5◦ N latitude and 91.8750◦ E to 144.750◦ E longitude.
8Survey data shows that over 95% of households within a 100km radius of occurrences over 5.5
magnitude are within 25km of the shock. The results from the estimation are robust to changing
the radius of the shock to 35 and 45 km. Interacting the the shock with magnitude of the shock has
no observable effects.
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To deflate expenditures, asset values, and prices of subsidized rice I used statistics
from the Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) which provides monthly price indices for up
to 45 cities in Indonesia. Each city or cities are matched to Kecamatans and a price
index is created around the survey months. Monetary values are all relative to 2007
base year. The price indices do not account for rural-urban price differences across
Kecamatans, due to a lack of rural price data.
1.4 Village Authority Problem
In this section I introduce a simple conceptual framework to understand the distribu-
tion of subsidized RASKIN rice to villagers. The framework takes into account the
welfare of two groups; non-poor and poor9. The objective of the central government
is for the poorest households in a village to receive the rice subsidy in any state of
the world10. However, from the IFLS data approximately 60% of the poorest get
access to the program while around 40% of the non-poor also get access to subsidized
rice. This suggests the village authority’s optimization decision is not aligned with
the central government over the distribution of RASKIN.
The village authority is assumed to be neither egalitarian or utilitarian and solves
the decision over the distribution of subsidized rice, both the quantity and number
of households in each group receiving subsidized rice. The agent’s choice over the
distribution of subsidized rice is contingent on the size of losses incurred by each
group, the number of poor households, and the bargaining power of the poor and non-
poor, all contingent on the state of nature. The objective function, which achieves a
Pareto efficient solution, is characterized as the weighted sum of the utilities of the
poor and the non-poor. The poor and the rich do not have equal say in the decision-
9The empirical section relies on more than two groups, however, for simplification I assume that
the poor are the poorest group considered in the empirical estimation. In this case, the non-poor is
synonymous with elite households. Here V ERY POORhct refers to the poor and MOD POORhct,
MODWEALTHYhct, V ERY WEALTHYhct refers to the non-poor.
10Program guidelines are constant with respect to shocks.
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making process over the allocation of RASKIN. The weights on the poor assigned
by the village authority are denoted λR(π) > 0 and non-poor λP (π) = 1 − λR(π) >
0. These weights may be a function of their personal benefit, either electorally or
through reciprocity expected from social contacts or family members to whom the
agent provides access11.
I present an illustrative special case of the of the village authority’s problem over
the allocation of resources. In this case the village authority chooses the number
of households XP , XR, that can participate in RASKIN only. It assumes that all
program participants receive the same amount of subsidized rice normalized to one.
This implies that the mean allocation to the poor or non-poor group is equivalent
to the proportion of each group receiving the program. The decision of the village
authority then collapses to a single one, namely how many households in each group
receive subsidized rice.
The aggregate welfare functions for the rich and the poor can be written as:
W P (XP ) =
XP
M
UP (1|ZP (π)) + (1− X
P
M








Hence, the village authority maximizes the weighted average utility over the rich and
the poor, choosing XP and XR, for given Zi(π) net income (income-savings-losses)
11Some authors such as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) model weights as endogenously deter-
mined through a voting model.
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(φ :)X̄ = XP +XR
(2.2)
If the village authority was allocating subsidized rice according to the central govern-
ment’s guidelines then λR(π) = 0 for all π states of the world and X̄ = XP As this is
not the case, and some wealthy households do get access to the program in all states,
solving above provides a simple solution to the first order conditions:
λP [UP (1|ZP (π))− UP (0|ZP (π))] = λR[UR(1|ZR(π))− UR(0|ZR(π))] (2.3)
where U i′(.) > 0 and U i′′(.) < 0.
Denote two states of nature as π0 (no disaster) and π1 (disaster). In the no dis-
aster state, given
[UP (1|ZP (π0))− UP (0|ZP (π0))]>[UR(1|ZR(π0))− UR(0|ZR(π0))]
then, λR(π0) > λ
P (π0) for X
R > 0 and at least some RASKIN rice to be allocated
to the wealthy. In other words, inferring that the utility benefit to the poor of
receiving a unit of subsidized rice is greater than the utility benefit to the non-poor
in the absence of the shock, the fact that any rice is targeted to non-poor households
implies that these households have greater bargaining power than the poor.
Now, assume X̄ remains constant, and the number of poor M does not change
(i.e. the pre-disaster classification of poor is kept post disaster). Then, for two states
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of nature π0 and π1 if 4ZR(π0 → π1) > 4ZP (π0 → π1) then there exists some
ZR(π0) > Z
R(π1) > Z
P (π0) > Z
P (π1) and λ
R(π1) ≥ λR(π0) > λP (π0) ≥ λP (π1) and
such that 4XR(π1 → π2) = −4XP (π1 → π2)
The above states that even if non-poor households loose more wealth than poor
households in a disaster, there exists some scenario in which, post losses, the non-poor
still retain more assets than the wealthy, and the difference in bargaining power of the
non-poor increases or stays the same (λR(π1) ≥ λR(π0)) such that more non-poor get
access to the program. This also means, and is shown in the empirical estimates, that
the difference in the weight put on richer households by the village authority, relative
what the central government would desire in any state, becomes more pronounced in
the face of a natural disaster.
To show this, note that if,
U i′(.) > 0 and U i′′(.) < 0
and ZR(π0) > Z
R(π1) > Z
P (π0) > Z
P (π1)
then by the concavity of the utility function
UR(1|ZR(π0))− UR(0|ZR(π0)) < UR(1|ZR(π1))− UR(0|ZR(π1))
< UP (1|ZP (π0))− UP (0|ZP (π0)) < UP (1|ZP (π1))− UP (0|ZP (π1))
In other words suppose net income levels post-shock are lower for both groups, but
net income is higher in both states for the non-poor than poor. Then the utility
benefit of receiving access to the program is always higher for the poor than non-poor
and is higher for both groups post-shock. Then IF
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4ZR(π0 → π1) > 4ZP (π0 → π1)
such that
[UR(1|ZR(π1))− UR(0|ZR(π1))]− [UR(1|ZR(π0))− UR(0|ZR(π0))]
> [UP (1|ZP (π1))− UP (0|ZP (π1))]− [UP (1|ZP (π0))− UP (0|ZP (π0))]
i.e. If in addition the non-poor loose relatively more than the poor (as expected) as
a result of a shock, the difference in the utility benefit from receiving the program is





UP (1|ZP (π1))− UP (0|ZP (π1))
UP (1|ZP (π0))− UP (0|ZP (π0))
(2.4)
Given (2.4), suppose the pre-shock weights still hold, λR(π) > λP (π), or although
not strictly necessary, if village authorities give a larger weight to the non-poor post-
shock12 such that λR(π1) ≥ λR(π0) > λP (π0) ≥ λP (π1). Then combining (2.3) &
(2.4) if follows that the inter-temporal benefit of receiving the program is higher for







P (1|ZP (π2))− UP (0|ZP (π2))]
λP (π1)[UP (1|ZP (π1))− UP (0|ZP (π1))]
which in turn implies
4XR(π1 → π2) = −4XP (π1 → π2)
i.e. assuming the total quantity of subsidized rice available to a village post earth-
12This could occur due to the electoral advantages of providing more services to relatively wealthier
households at the expense of the poorest when the former experience hardship. It could also occur
due to non-electoral motivations, simply due to stronger social or family ties of the non-poor to local
leaders and either altruism or reciprocal relationships with these connections
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quake remains the same the village authority would transfer some of the subsidized
rice away from the poor towards the non-poor.
The above proposition simply describes that during a natural disaster the number
of rich households getting access to a subsidized food security program may increase
while decreasing access of the poor. This can occur if wealthier households face larger
relative losses than poorer households. Under such circumstances if losses faced by
wealthier households are sufficiently large such that the inter-temporal benefit is larger
for the rich than for the poor, then the rich win and the poor loose.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The identification strategy below aims to test a few specific questions on the relation-
ship between earthquake shocks and resource allocation through the subsidized ‘rice
for poor’ (RASKIN) program. First, what is the impact of earthquakes on affected
households’ access to RASKIN along the extensive margin, and intensive margin -
through quantity caps and price for rice (if participating)? How does this impact
vary by poverty status13? Second, did the high impact earthquakes within the two
years prior to the 2008 survey deplete household asset stocks and generate a negative
consumption response contingent on household pre-disaster within village rank14? Is
the consumption and asset response of households sufficient to justify RASKIN al-
location? Third, how does variation in intra village social capital, through the level
of pre-disaster participation community meetings, the number of community groups,
affect within village distribution of the rice for poor program post-earthquakes?
The distribution of earthquake communities suggests that the occurrence of shocks
over the long term in the area should be random. However, because I focus on a
13Ex ante, within village wealth status is established for current survey year using prior IFLS
survey household and community data
14In the case IFLS communities surveyed in Indonesia, the last earthquake affecting households’
prior to 2008 was in March 2007.
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two year period and capture extreme earthquakes in a few locations I find that pre-
disaster household and village characteristics that may affect outcomes are correlated
with exposure to earthquakes (Appendix Table 1). Hence, along with difference-
in-difference, I Propensity Score Match (PSM) households along several household
and community characteristics at baseline using IFLS3 (2000) to ensure pre-disaster
parallel trends (IFLS2 (1997) & IFLS3)15 and comparability (across IFLS3 & IFLS4).
Using data on a panel of respondents, difference-in-difference estimation is carried out
on the weighted, matched sample.
For the estimation strategy, let t2008 control for the change in the outcome across
the survey years and take on a value equal to one in the post earthquake period.
Further, let Yjhct be the outcome variable with j indexing the outcome of interest,
household h, in community c, at time t. Here, Yjε {logPCFE, logPCNFE1, logPC-
NFE2, logPCE, logPCDE, VAL ASSETS, logVAL ASSETS, OWNLAND, log VAL
JEWELRY, log VAL SAVINGS, OPK, OPK QUANTITY, log OPK PRICE}, where
log denotes the natural logarithm of the variable. For a matched sample I estimate
the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATET), comparing treatment and con-
trol units, pre and post-earthquake:
E(γjhc|X,Z) = {E(Yjhct|Xhct, Zct, EQhc = 1, t2008 = 1)− E(Yjhct|Xhct, Zct, EQhc = 1, t2008 = 0)}
− {E(Yjhct|Xhct, Zct, EQhc = 0, t2008 = 1)− E(Yjhct|Xhct, Zct, EQhc = 0, t2008 = 0)
To estimate the ATET, the equation below is used. This tests the underlying ques-
tions of whether in the aftermath of catastrophic earthquakes household are able to
recover to pre-disaster levels of consumption and asset stocks, and if affected areas
received more subsidized rice through the RASKIN program:
15IFLS2 is not used in the empirical estimation as it does not have data on safety net program.
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Yhct = γ0 + γ1EQhc ∗ t2008 + γ2EQhc + γ3t2008







+βh + ηp + εhct
(1.1)
where βh here represents household level fixed effects that capture time invariant
household characteristics. In addition, ηp province-time level fixed effects are included
to purge the data of fixed differences across provinces in a given data period. The
standard errors are also clustered at the community level to capture intra-community
correlation. The primary coefficients of interest would be those on the EQhc ∗ t2008
reflecting the average treatment effect on the treated.
The Xhct household level controls used in the estimation are age of head, gender of
head, years of schooling of head, marital status of head, years in village of household
head, household size. Village controls, Zct, include number of health posts, proportion
of households with electricity, proportion of households with piped water, access to
large and small microfinance institutions in village, village population, urban, number
of earthquakes 2000-2005, number of earthquakes 1975-1999.
To address the latter part of the heterogenous effect on safety net allocation by
household wealth standing within the village, the triple difference equation below is
estimated.
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γ6kRANKhc,t−s ∗ t2008 +
4∑
k=1
γ7kRANKhc,t−s ∗ EQhc ∗ t2008






EQhc + βh + ηp + εhct
(1.2)
In the equation above let RANKxhct where x = 1, 2, 3, 4 indexes wealth standing
in the village RANK1hct = 1 if the household is classified as very poor (more than one
std. dev. below the community mean). Similarly, RANK2hct = 1 if the household is
moderately poor (between mean and one std. dev. below the mean), RANK3hct = 1
if moderately wealthy (between mean and one std. dev. above the mean), and
RANK4hct = 1 if very wealthy (more than one std. dev. above village mean). The
primary coefficients of interest is γ7 which measures the triple difference impact of
various allocation rules by the social planner.
To address the impact of pre-existing social capital on disaster affected household’s
access to the RASKIN program, I estimate (1.2) above but for a sample stratified at
various social capital cutoffs, i.e. OPKhct(|SC = x). In this specification, SC is the
the pre-disaster level of social capital stratified into groups. In the case of proportion
of households participating in community meetings x={>0.7, >0.6, >0.5, <=0.5,




To investigate the impact of exposure to earthquake risk over a two year period,
in 2006 and 2007, on households’ consumption response , several components of
consumption expenditures are measured. The measure PCEhct = PCFEhct +
PCNFE1hct + PCNFE2hct is per capita household expenditure on non-durables.
Here, PCFEhct, measures per capita monthly expenditures on households food con-
sumption. PCNFE1hct is per capita monthly non-food expenditure on electricity,
water, fuel, tel etc., personal toiletries, household items, domestic services(servants
wages etc), transport (gasoline, bus/cab fares etc), arisan and recreation or entertain-
ment. PCNFE2hct is an annual measure converted to monthly per capita non-food
expenditures which includes spending on clothing for children and adults, household
supplies and furniture, rituals, ceremonies, charities, gifts and taxes. In addition to
these consumption variables, household expenditures on durables PCDEhct is also
measured.
In order to estimate the effect of these specific disasters on the destruction and
depletion of household assets stocks, I use measures of the value of household as-
sets. The variable PC V ALUEASSETShct measures the per capita total Indonesian
Rupiah value of assets including house, other house/building, non agricultural land,
savings, vehicles, household appliances, furniture and jewelry. I also separately es-
timate the impact on OWN LANDhct which is an indicator variable of ownership
of land not used in farm or other business. Impacts on V AL JEWELRYhct and
V AL SAV INGShct which are unlikely to be destroyed and more likely to be used as
a buffer against shocks.
Given the primary interest in the study lies in identifying the differential impacts
of the disaster by household poverty level, I construct a within village poverty measure
for each household for the 1997 and 2000 survey years. Household relative depriva-
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tion in the village before the shock is measured using a distance index that compares
household wealth to average wealth within the village. A household a wealth index is
created using principal component analysis. The variable WEALTHhct is an index
constructed from the ownership of assets as well as household welfare indicators in-
cluding use of electricity for cooking, type of sanitation facilities and water sources are
used. Based on this measure, community mean wealth factor and standard deviation
are determined. A household is classified as V ERY POORhct within the village if it
lies more than one standard deviation below the village mean, MODPOORhct if be-
tween mean and one standard deviation below mean, MODWEALTHYhct if between
mean and one standard deviation above mean, and finally V ERY WEALTHYhct if
more than one standard deviation above the mean. For a given survey year, house-
hold wealth standing in the prior survey is used, this is mainly to establish ex-ante
status within the village for earthquake affected households.
Table A2 characterizes household ownership of various assets and status by pre-
disaster within village wealth standing. For both earthquake affected and unaffected
areas, there is a monotonic relationship between the proportion of households owning
an asset, or proportion with given status, and within village wealth standing, suggest-
ing that this is a good composite measure of household position within the village.
The difference across groups in proportion ownership of an asset is larger for some
assets, and these assets are given a greater weight in the determination of household
wealth factor score. Table A3 provides information on the number of households,
stratified by earthquake affected and unaffected areas, falling into each wealth group
for the matched sample. The number of households falling into each group is suffi-
ciently large to allow the estimation of differential effects by wealth group.
To examine the distribution of safety net transfers across affected and unaffected
areas and across households within a village I use three outcomes of interest. These
include OPKhct, which indicates participation in the food security rice subsidy pro-
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gram for the poor. The other two outcomes, denoted OPK QUANTITYhct, and
OPK PRICEhct, are quantity of purchases and price conditional on purchase in the
last four weeks. One caveat is that in the 2000 baseline survey, only the total amount
spent on purchase of subsidized rice (P̃Q) and the estimated value in the market
(P̂Q) are recorded for each household. Hence, I employ an alternate strategy to de-
compose the quantity and price of subsidized rice. Among households interviewed in
2000, 80 percent of interviewed households state that they usually purchase medium
quality rice, with just 4 percent stating they purchase low quality rice. In the IFLS
2000 community survey, three price points for medium quality rice in the market are
established using three merchants in each community. I calculate the average market
price of medium quality rice (P̂ ) across the three merchants. For each household,
in the 2000 survey, I divide the estimated market value for the purchase of subsi-
dized rice by the average market price of medium quality rice ( P̂Q
P̂
) to determine the
quantity of subsidized rice purchased. Subsequently, I divide the estimated purchase
value of subsidized rice by the estimated quantity of subsidized rice purchased ( P̃Q
Q
)
to calculate the price of subsidized rice for the household 16.
To examine if higher or lower levels of social capital translate into differences in
post-disaster resource allocation, indicating differences in governance, first, I stratify
the sample at several cutoffs of pre-disaster proportion of households participating
in community meetings. Household members were asked if they had participated in
community meetings in the last 12 months. I classify a household as having par-
ticipated if at least one member of the household participated. Second, I consider
an alternative measure of pre-earthquake social capital, namely the number of social
16These data a verified against the quantity of subsidized rice derived another way, and results
on quantity do not differ across methods. In the other method, the subsidized value of purchases
(P̃Q) is divided by community level price per KG of rice for those participating in the rice for poor
program. This assumes that all households participating in OPK rice program pay the same price
for subsidized rice. While this should be the norm, data from the 2007 survey shows that for most
villages, there is some variation in household reported price paid for subsidized rice, consistent with
mismanagement in the program. The first method of calculating the price and quantity of subsidized
rice is the preferred method, as it is expected to be subject to less measurement error.
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groups found in a community among a set of 8 groups including Village Coopera-
tive, Youth Group, Village Mobile Library and Neighborhood Watch Program. The
pre-disaster number of social groups is taken as a measure of existing social capital
within the village. Variable SCct measures the social capital cutoff level for villages
in the stratified sample. For social capital measured as proportion of households par-
ticipating in community meeting, SCct ε {>0.7, >0.6, >0.5, <=0.5, <=0.6 <=0.7}.
For the number of community social groups, x ranges from SCct ε { >=4, >=3, <5,
<4}.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Distribution of Social Safety Net Programs in Earthquake Af-
fected Villages
In Table 1, I estimate the relationship between participation in RASKIN and vil-
lage earthquake status in the post-disaster period. Participation is measured both
at the extensive margin - through access to the program - and intensive margin -
through quantity cap and price paid for subsidized rice17. Columns (1) and (2) show
that participation for households in earthquake villages was 12.2 - 12.7% higher than
unaffected counterparts18. This suggests first, that the central government uses the
subsidized rice safety net program as a form of insurance against disasters. Second,
because village authorities distribute the resources it would also suggest that these
authorities pass on at least some of the benefits received19 in the process of distribu-
17The estimation controls for interview month and day to control for seasonal variation in prices
and quantities, which is particularly important in the context of rice.
18One caveat is that the last measured earthquake occurred in May 2007, thus because the indi-
cator measures ‘access to the program within the last 12 months’ there is a possibility that some
households in earthquake villages participated in RASKIN prior to the earthquake. However, it is
unlikely that such a household that participated in the last 12 months did not participate within
the last 9 months. As such, the coefficient on participation in earthquake areas may be slightly
underestimated
19Missing rice through RASKIN has been citied as one main problem of the program, Olken (2006)
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tion.
Similarly, from columns (3) to (6) in Table 1, households in earthquake affected
communities are likely to purchase approximately 0.35 - 0.49 KG more of subsidized
rice per capita and pay a 12.3 - 13.0% lower price on the rice, conditional on purchasing
rice in the 4 weeks prior to survey. Within-village prices for RASKIN rice exhibit
significant variation, meaning prices too are controlled by village authorities. If prices
paid by households in earthquake communities are lower, then village authorities
would be responsible for increasing household access to rice through lower prices in
response to disaster.
The difference-in-difference framework used to examine the difference across earth-
quake affected and unaffected communities is adapted to a triple difference model in
order to accommodate household wealth standing within the community. Due to the
endogeneity of wealth in the post-earthquake period to receipt of aid, I use lagged
wealth-standing to represent household position, using household wealth standing in
the 2000 survey for households in 2008, and wealth standing in the 1997 survey for
households in 2000. Using wealth standing in 2000 as a proxy for pre-earthquake
wealth may create some measurement error as shocks are taken only from the two
years following 2006, for the 2008 survey. However, in the sample the correlation
in wealth factor score between 2000 and 2008 surveys is 0.70. The same correlation
between the 1997 and 2000 surveys was 0.78.
Village authorities in Indonesia were responsible for distributing these resources to
the poorest households. Differentiation by within village wealth standing is provided
in Table 2. In this Table post-earthquake period by earthquake affected is interacted
with household wealth standing. The coefficient ‘2008*Earthquake’ estimates the im-
pact of the shock for poorest households within a community. Specifications (1) and
(2), Table 2, suggest that the poorest of the poor households within a village affected
by earthquakes, are less likely by 9.2% to 11.6%, by specification with and without
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fixed effects, to have participated in RASKIN over the last 12 months. Columns
(1) and (2) also show, however, that for all other groups of households access to
the RASKIN program increases if affected by an earthquake. From (2), the estima-
tion that includes household fixed effects , moderately poor, moderately wealthy and
wealthiest households experience a 6% (17.6-11.6) to 12.9% (24.5 -11.6) increase in ac-
cess to RASKIN. The increase in participation in the post-disaster period for affected
households in the moderately poor, moderately wealthy and wealthiest households
comes at a cost to the poorest of the poor.
Table 2, columns (3) to (6) provides coefficient estimates for the impact of earth-
quakes on quantity and price of rice purchased through RASKIN, in post disaster
period by household within village wealth standing. The results are conditional on
household purchasing rice within the last 4 weeks. In contrast to the results on par-
ticipation in RASKIN at the extensive margin, the results suggest that earthquake
affected households in the poorest wealth group already participating in the program
are able to purchase a larger quantity of rice per capita. Both columns (3) and (4) also
suggest that as a result of the earthquake moderately wealthy and wealthiest house-
holds participating in the program are likely to receive lower quantity of rice compared
to the poorest households. However, the fixed effect specification in column (4) shows
that although the purchased quantity for the moderately wealthy group is lower than
for the poorest, it is still positive. For the wealthiest group, the per capita quantity
of purchased rice is significantly lower than for the poorest households with access
to the RASKIN program. From column (4), poorest households purchase on average
0.52 KG per capita above households in non-earthquake areas, while the moderately
poor and moderately wealthy households purchase 0.64 (0.52 + 0.12) and 0.26(0.52
- 0.26) KG per capita more than the average poorest household in non-earthquake
areas, through RASKIN. For the wealthiest group, per capita quantity purchased is
0.25 KG lower (0.52KG -0.77 KG) than the poorest in non-earthquake areas.
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On heterogeneity of price paid for RASKIN rice, from (5) and (6) results on
changes in the price of rice provide evidence that the poorest of the poor in fact,
receive a 22.5% lower price than poor households in 2006 in non-earthquake areas,
significant at the 1% level, for the purchase of subsidized RASKIN rice. The difference
in the price paid for RASKIN rice is insignificant for moderately poor households rela-
tive to the poorest. The moderately poor households in earthquake affected areas pay
nearly 20% more for rice than all households in non-earthquake areas. Moderately
wealthy and wealthiest households pay 0.3% and 5% above the poorest households
in earthquake areas. However, the difference is again insignificant. The results sug-
gest that the moderately wealthy also received as much of a benefit in the price of
subsidized rice as the poorest, conditional on participation, as a result of the disaster.
The results on participation in RASKIN along the intensive margin exhibit signif-
icant heterogeneity. It is clear that the poorest of the poor participating in RASKIN
receive significant benefits from the program. Similarly, while the moderately poor
participating in the program may not receive any price benefits, such households still
get to purchase a quantity above that of those in non-earthquake areas. Earthquake
affected moderately wealthy are also able to purchase a quantity above those in non-
earthquake areas, but more significantly experience the same price as that paid by
poorest households.
The findings in this section indicate that the poorest of the poor, by pre-disaster
standing, were less likely to participate in the rice for poor program relative to non-
earthquake poor households. This is in contrast to the results of higher overall pro-
gram participation in earthquake affected areas. It also stands in contrast to findings
that participation increases across all other groups, the moderately poor, the moder-
ately wealthy and wealthy, within the village. Regardless of exposure to earthquakes,
program participation across households increases over time, except for the poorest
of the poor in earthquake areas, making this specific case an interesting one. On
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the other hand, for households participating in the program, the poorest of the poor
and moderately wealthy receive the greatest benefits in price and quantity access to
subsidized rice.
1.6.2 Household Consumption and Buffer Stock Response: Justifying
the Safety Net Distribution
Given the endogeneity of household wealth with disasters it is difficult for the econo-
metrician to determine which households are the neediest post-disaster. However,
household consumption and asset responses to earthquakes, by pre-disaster within
village wealth standing, can be measured. Results in section 6.1, show that village
authorities target safety net aid meant for the poorest households to wealthier groups.
Hence, I hypothesize that resources may have been channelled towards households
with the largest relative losses and greatest say in the authority’s decision making
process. As findings below will show, the poorest households were also unable to fully
insure against the observed earthquakes, and consume at the lowest level among all
groups. Thus in the aftermath of a shock, there is a failure to target the intended
beneficiaries of the rice for poor program.
The ability of a household to recover and insure against community level shocks
is likely to be contingent on the households level of asset stocks. For earthquakes,
although wealthier households are expected to lose more destructible assets, the pro-
portion of losses relative to initial wealth may not differ significantly across groups.
For the period over which I analyze shocks, 2006 to 2007, the first shock occurred
in May 2006, and the last in March 2007. I estimate the impact of a shock on a
household’s consumption response after a 9 to 19 month period20. The response of
some groups of household’s relative to others in adjusting consumption to a transitory
20The regressions control for interview month to avoid seasonal differences, particularly in prices
and quantities for food and subsidized rice
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earthquake shock could potentially justify differences in the way safety net resources
are allocated.
From Table 4, households in earthquake affected villages are unable to insure
fully against the impact. This result corroborates with findings from other studies
such as Carter et al. (2006), Morris and Wodon (2003), who study insurance under
severe environmental shocks in Ethiopia and Honduras. Consumption is measured in
log terms to estimate proportional changes. From estimation (1) and (2) in Table 4,
controlling for observed and time invariant household characteristics, and past shocks,
consumption excluding that of durables, measured on coefficient ‘2008*Earthquake’
is 11.8% lower in earthquake affected villages. The effect comes primarily from non-
food consumption. From Table 4, columns (3) and (4), disaster villages face 10%
lower food consumption, for the fixed effect specification, this effect is significant at
the 5% level.
Non-food consumption is divided into two groups, the first includes spending on
basic necessities such as electricity, water, fuel, transportation. The second non-food
group contains items that are more discretionary, such as clothing, spending on rituals
and ceremonies. The fixed effects specifications estimating the relationship between
earthquakes and non-food spending, specifications (6) and (8) Table 4, shows that
households reduce spending by 9.8% and 26.3% in basic and discretionary consump-
tion respectively. The results for basic is significant at the 10% level while that for
discretionary is at the 5%level. These results lend support to an empirically well doc-
umented claim that budget constrained households cannot smooth out consumption
spending in the face of natural disasters.
In the short term, after being affected by an earthquake, households’ may need
to rebuild durable assets. However, as shown in columns (9) and (10), spending
on durables is 38.6% lower in earthquake affected villages, conditional on spending
a positive amount. The result provides evidence that although re-building may be
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a priority, there is no observed increase in this area. This could be explained by
post-disaster household need to allocate resources towards competing needs in food
and non-food spending. In particular for households affected by large earthquakes,
governmental and disaster aid organizations may provide insufficient support at the
household level.
Providing disaster affected households with rice through the existing RASKIN
program, could allow households to substitute resources towards other food and non-
food spending. The existing social safety net program could potentially serve as an
effective way to distribute resources during a crisis. Table 5 compares consumption
in earthquake villages to that in no-earthquake villages and moderately poor, mod-
erately wealthy, wealthy households to the poorest within the village. Estimations
(1) and (2) in Table 5, control for survey year, wealth standing in prior survey, and
earthquake effect individually and interacted. For poorest households, in the fixed
effects estimation, consumption post-earthquake is 12.4% lower than non-earthquake
poor, significant at the 10% level. The size of the relative impact is close to zero
for the moderately poor, with the difference between the poorest and the moderately
poor being insignificant. The moderately wealthy and wealthiest groups are strongly
impacted by earthquake shocks as expected, consuming 43% and 41% below that for
the poorest households with the difference being significant at the 5% level.
The results in Table 5, columns (3) and (4) show a negative food consumption
response by all groups except the moderately poor for the earthquakes studied in the
paper. While the poorest and wealthiest groups reduce food consumption by 11% to
15%, the changes are not significant. Food consumption of the moderately wealthy
group does not appear to be insulated during earthquake shocks. In earthquake areas,
moderately wealthy households incur a proportional loss of 35% below the poorest
households. Results in specifications (5) and (6) for basic non-food consumption,
show lower consumption across all groups, with the poorest households consuming
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12.4% less than the poorest in non-earthquake areas, and the other groups consuming
19% to 23% less than their unaffected counterparts. However, none of the differences
are significant. For discretionary non-food consumption, (7) and (8), consumption for
poorest group in earthquake affected areas is 24% below consumption in unaffected
areas. For the moderately poor in earthquake areas, consumption in the discretionary
non-food group is 10.4% higher than unaffected areas. The difference between the
poorest and the moderately poor, is again insignificant. For the moderately wealthy
and wealthiest groups, the difference in discretionary non-food consumption relative
to the poorest group is significant, and the proportional difference is large, with spend-
ing in both groups falling by over 60% in earthquake affected areas. Specifications (9)
and (10) representing a decline in durables spending are the only instances in which
all groups excluding the poorest incur large declines, while the poor are insulated. In
this case for households spending on durables, spending falls by 180% to 234% across
the three groups.
Table 6 shows mean levels of consumption among each wealth group, with and
without the earthquake in the pre-and post disaster periods. From this Table, the Ru-
piah value of consumption for the poorest is lower in level terms than their wealthier
counterparts. The results on consumption clearly indicate that by pre disaster sta-
tus, relative to the poorest of the poor, moderately wealthy and wealthiest households
perform significantly worse, in terms of a relative decline in consumption. However,
per capita consumption for the wealthiest and moderately wealthy is 356,0404 Ru-
piah and 291,984 Rupiah respectively, while just 210,727 Rupiah per capita for the
poorest of the poor. In fact mean consumption for all groups, see Table 6, is signif-
icantly higher than for the poorest. The question is then whether households with
larger proportional losses or households with the lowest level of consumption receive
differentially greater access to RASKIN in the aftermath of a disaster. The answer
may be a function of the level of say each group has over the allocation decision of
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RASKIN rice.
Table 7, estimates the impact of exposure to earthquakes on household asset
stocks. Across all specifications, household assets are significantly depleted post
earthquake. From columns (1) and (2) the real per capita Rupiah value of assets
declines significantly. From columns (3) and (4) in log assets value terms, earthquake
affected areas incur a 19-27% decline over the unaffected areas. Table 5 includes
estimation over an additional set of household assets, that are unlikely to be destruc-
tible in a disaster but may be used by households as a form of insurance against
shocks. Results in columns (5) and (6) show that ownership of land not used for
farming or non-farm business activities, thus investment or inherited land, is lower
by approximately 14% in earthquake affected areas.
Two other forms of assets that can be used as a buffer stock are jewelry and
saving. Franeknberg et al. (2003) have shown that jewelry in particular, was used by
Indonesian households during the Asian Financial Crisis, to smooth consumption. In
fact, (7) and (8) similarly suggest that households deplete jewelry stocks to insure
against earthquake shocks. The fixed effects estimation shows that households’ value
of jewelry declined by roughly 19% in earthquake areas compared to no earthquake
areas. While results in Table 7, columns (9) and (10) show that the value of households
savings also declined in earthquake areas, the difference in insignificant and most
households in the matched sample do not own a savings account, suggesting that the
use of this mechanism by households is limited.
The impact of earthquakes on asset stocks by pre-disaster within village wealth
standing is shown in Table 8. While it is expected that wealthier households would
lose more assets during an earthquake, one can also assume that wealthier households
are likely to have a larger buffer stock of non-destructible assets to insure against
shocks. The results in estimation (1) to (4) measure the effect on value of assets and
log value of assets. The preferred fixed effect specification (4) suggest that moderately
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wealthy and wealthiest households lose 36% and 44% of assets respectively. The loss
in log value of assets is significant at the 10% level for both groups, relative to the
poorest. The results on consumption and wealth effects show that for the specific
earthquakes studied, moderately wealthy households fare worse than other groups, in
terms of proportional losses relative to the pre-disaster level. From columns (5) and
(6), Table 8, this group is also approximately 4% and 10% more likely in earthquake
areas to have lost investment land relative to the moderately poor and wealthiest
groups, respectively. While the moderately poor and wealthiest groups experienced a
probability of de-cumulating land 16% and 21% below poorest households, the results
were not significantly different from the poorest counterparts. For the log value of
jewelry, earthquake affected moderately poor households observe a 23% decline in the
value of jewelry.
Table 9, shows the mean level of assets by wealth group, pre and post-earthquake.
As expected, there is a monotonic relationship between the size of assets losses and
wealth standing for earthquake areas. However, similar to the impact of earthquakes
on consumption, mean assets levels are significantly higher, even in the aftermath of
a disaster for wealthier households.
Due to the nature of high impact earthquakes, it is impossible to predict a clear
association between earthquakes and impact by household group. This section of
results highlights the impact of a transitory shock like earthquakes on the inability
of households to smooth consumption, and utilize assets, by within village household
wealth standing for the observed earthquakes. The empirical estimates presented
above show that differences between the poorest of the poor and moderately poor
groups are minimal, and both groups have a negative consumption response to earth-
quakes.
The results also suggest the both the moderately wealthy and wealthiest were likely
to face the largest proportional losses relative to pre-disaster consumption and asset
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stocks. However, in addition to the negative consumption response, the poorest of the
poor in earthquake areas also consume far less, and own fewer assets, than households
in other wealth standings. Thus, the results on the distribution of RASKIN post-
earthquakes suggests that larger proportional losses are rewarded more than lower
absolute consumption in disaster affected communities with decentralized targeting.
1.6.3 Heterogenous Effects: Social Capital and Within Village Access
to RASKIN
Better social capital is thought to improve governance (Putnam (1993)). I use ob-
served differences in pre-earthquake social capital to examine how such differences
affect the distribution of rice for the poor by wealth standing. The sample is stratified
by several cutoffs of the proportion of the village community participating in commu-
nity meetings in prior survey year. Stratification occurs at strictly greater than, and
less than or equal to 70%, 60% and 50% participation. Table 10 shows estimation
results on the distribution of RASKIN, of this stratification. From columns (1) to (6)
for participation exceeding 70%, 60% and 50%, the distribution of RASKIN is more
strongly favored away from poorest households and towards wealthier households in
earthquake affected areas. At higher levels of pre-disaster community participation,
a larger proportion of poorest households are likely to be excluded from the RASKIN
program relative to the poorest households in non-earthquake areas. When participa-
tion exceeds 70%, in the fixed effects specification in column (2), 34%, of the poorest
households loose access to subsidized rice, while 6% to 7% of each of the moderately
poor, moderately wealthy and wealthiest households gain access to the program rel-
ative to households in non-earthquake areas. By contrast, from columns (7) to (12),
when pre-disaster community participation is below 50%, 60% and 70%, the poor-
est households in earthquake areas are more likely to gain access to the program.
When community participation falls below 50%, from column (8), 27% more poorest
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households gain access to RASKIN over the wealthiest.
The results suggest that for communities with greater pre-earthquake participation
in community meetings, in the aftermath of a disaster the poorest are more likely to be
marginalized compared to communities with lower levels of pre-disaster participation
21. This means, when more households participate in a meeting, more demands of
the wealthiest and moderately wealthy households are heard, relative to the poorest,
because more households from all wealth standings participate. On the other hand,
when fewer households participate, fewer of the poorest are placed out of the program
because fewer households from any group participate, and fewer of the wealthier
participate as well.
Similar results can be seen in Table 11, which stratifies communities by the num-
ber of pre-disaster community social groups. In communities with greater than or
equal to 3 or 4 social groups, the poorest households are again more likely to be
excluded from RASKIN participation relative to non-earthquake areas and wealthier
groups. For communities with fewer than 4 or 5 social groups, I observe a positive,
insignificant effect of the shock on RASKIN participation for the poor. The moder-
ately poor however, in earthquake areas are significantly more likely to participate in
the RASKIN program regardless of the number of social groups in the village.
Putnam (1993)’s argument that higher levels of social capital improves governance,
does not necessarily hold under natural disasters. When social capital - pre-disaster
participation in community meeting and number of social groups - is high, in earth-
quake areas, the demands of wealthier groups may be more likely to be met relative
to the poorest households. This suggests that the bargaining power of the wealthier
is higher than that of the poor and has a differential effect on outcomes in post-
earthquake environments when households face a negative consumption and asset
response to shocks.
21Analysis of the impact of earthquakes on consumption by wealth standing shows no distinct
patterns. The results are not included but may be obtained form the author.
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1.6.4 Robustness Checks
1.6.4.1 Household access to RASKIN excluding 25-50 km periphery
For the purpose of the study I define the treatment group as households exposed to
an earthquake over magnitude 5.5 within 25 km of the epicenter. If villages in the
periphery of the 25 km radius are also affected significantly by a high magnitude
earthquake in the 2006 to 2007 period, then the coefficients on household access
to RASKIN for the 0-25km group may be biased. Figure A1 shows the number of
IFLS villages exposed to an earthquake over magnitude 5.5 within a 25-50 km radius
of the epicenter. To establish that the impact of earthquakes on villages within a
0-25 km radius without the bias discussed above, I exclude villages within a 25-
50 km radius of the epicenter from the control group. This prevents any bias on the
coefficient measuring the post-earthquake impact of RASKIN by incorrect assignment
to the control group. The results in Table A4 uses the same specification as Table
2 but excludes the 25-50 km periphery. As with prior results the treatment group
is propensity score matched to a similar group of unaffected households to form a
control group.
Table A4 shows the post-earthquake distribution of participation in RASKIN,
quantity of subsidized rice purchased and price paid for subsidized rice by household
pre-disaster wealth ranking. Table A4 excludes villages within 25-50km radius of
epicenter. From the results in column (2), household fixed effects specification, the
poorest are 12.9% less likely to participate in the rice for poor program relative to
other groups in earthquake areas and similar households in non-earthquake areas.
Simultaneously, the moderately poor, moderately wealthy and wealthiest groups are
18.8% to 20.2% more likely to participate in RASKIN relative to the poorest.
Columns (3) to (6) in Table A4 suggest that post-earthquake impacts on the
distribution of rice for poor at the intensive margin have the largest significant impact
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on the poorest group of households. From columns (3) and (4), as a result of the
earthquake the poorest are likely to purchase 0.59 to 0.89 KG per capita more of rice
in the last 4 weeks compared to households in non-earthquake areas and other wealth
groups. Columns (5) and (6) show that the poorest in earthquake affected villages
pay 18.5 to 31.9 % lower prices for the subsidized rice purchased. The results are
comparable both in magnitude and direction to the results in Table 2. These results
suggest that there is no significant bias generated from including households with a
25-50 km radius of the epicenter for earthquakes over 5.5 magnitude in the control
group.
1.6.4.2 Household access to RASKIN using artificial treatment groups
In order to test the hypothesis that the observed impacts on within village targeting
of RASKIN were driven by the impact on the correctly selected treatment group, I
create alternative treatment groups to households’ falling within 25 km of an earth-
quake. The first artificial treatment group uses villages within the 25-50 km group as
treated, while excluding those in the 0-25km group from the analysis. Similarly, the
second artificial treatment group assigns villages in the 50-75 km group as treated
and excludes all villages within 50km of the epicenter of a 5.5 or higher magnitude
earthquake. This ensures that the observed results on household access to the rice
for poor RASKIN program both at the extensive and intensive margins, for house-
holds’ affected by catastrophic earthquakes, can be attributed to the true earthquake
effect. For the difference-in-difference estimation the artificial treatment groups were
matched to similar household units using the same PSM method described in the
appendix.
Results are shown in Table A5 where the first panel assigns households as exposed
to earthquakes if within 25-50 km of epicenter and the second if within 50-75 km of
the epicenter. The first two columns of the first panel shows no significant impact of
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being assigned to the artificial treatment group on household access to RASKIN. The
signs on participation in RASKIN is positive even for the poorest households and
contradicts the result found using the actual treatment group. Similarly, columns
(3) and (4) show no significant coefficients on quantity of subsidized rice purchased
through RASKIN. The signs on quantity of subsidized rice purchased by the poorest
and moderately poor in the artificial treatment group of the first panel, relative to
other groups and the control group, are in the opposite direction to the signs displayed
in Table 2 for the actual treatment. Column (6) in the first panel of Table A5 shows
a negative significant impact on the post earthquake impact on moderately poor and
moderately wealthy groups on price paid for subsidized rice of the artificial treatment
group. While this result is unexpected, the direction of the results are the opposite
of results in Table 2. The result suggests that for villages in the periphery of the
earthquakes of 2006 to 2007, the moderately poor and moderately wealthy may have
benefitted from lower prices relative to the poorest households. Very similar results
can be observed in the second panel of Table A5 using villages within 50-75 km of
epicenter as the artificial treatment group. As with the results in the first panel,
relative to the poorest households the moderately poor pay a lower price for the
subsidized rice, statistically significant at the 10% level in the household fixed effect
specification. While one may expect households within 25-50 km of the epicenter of
an over 5.5 magnitude earthquake, it is unlikely that households in a 50-75 radius
are also affected. This suggests that some other factor, other than being affected by
an earthquake, is driving the observed results on prices for the artificial treatment
groups.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper examines whether safety nets are effective in insuring households during
disasters. The empirical findings indicate that the poorest of the poor households in
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earthquake affected villages are significantly more likely to be placed out of the rice
for poor program examined, relative to other households within the village and similar
households in unaffected villages 22. Wealthier households, on the other hand, gain
greater access to such programs after disasters. The safety net program is designed to
provide rice at a subsidized price to the poorest households within a village. Therefore,
shifting resources towards less poor households during a crisis should be justified by
increased need among the less poor. I show that the non-poor do loose a greater
proportion of pre-disaster consumption and of assets, than the poorest households.
However, a comparison of level of consumption among poorest and less poor show
that the poorest are still poorer post earthquake than wealthier household groups.
For the poor that participate in RASKIN, the per capita quantity of rice purchased
is higher and the price paid for subsidized rice is lower in earthquake areas.
These findings provide some evidence that reliance on social safety net programs
using decentralized targeting in the aftermath of a disaster may be ineffective. In
addition, such programs may funnel resources away from the neediest households.
From a policy perspective more attention needs to be placed on the way in which
such programs are utilized in high disaster risk areas. Alternative designs of such
programs and use of other aid programs post disasters may be more effective in
22One may argue that an alternative explanation for increased (or decreased) access of households’
to safety net resources may be due to increased (or decreased) central government oversight rather
than cooperative behavior and subsequent community influence. There are a few reasons why this
explanation is unlikely. The empirical analysis relies on a difference in difference (DD) framework
that compares earthquake affected areas to similar areas not affected by earthquakes, implying that
government oversight would have to increase only in the earthquake affected areas. However, most
parts of Indonesia are plagued by several different crisis, making it unlikely that government would
not increase oversight on all areas. In addition, even if government increased (or decreased) oversight
in just earthquake areas, this would mostly fall into the hands of the local authorities to report,
which would once again lead to the problem of their corruption. In-between distribution of rice to
the village head and it reaching households, rice goes missing or is not accessible to poor households
(Olken (2006)) and increasing oversight would be difficult as village authorities can report doing
something different than what actually happens with distribution. In other words, the problem
would stem from community influence on the decisions of the local authority driven by cooperation
or fragility of the village which works hand in hand with increased or decreased government oversight.
The literature on Indonesian safety net programs shows no qualitative evidence of an increase in
government oversight in earthquake affected areas.
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targeting the neediest households.
Finally, I address how variations in pre-disaster levels of social capital affected
the distribution of subsidized rice through the RASKIN program. I find that greater
participation in community meetings by villagers, or more social groups in a village,
does not lead to an improved outcome for the poorest households. Results in this
paper suggest that higher levels of social capital within a village are more likely to
lead to a larger diversion of RASKIN resources away from the poorest. Greater
participation in community meetings is linked to greater participation among all
wealth groups in the village. Intuitively, under greater participation if more elite,
or wealthier groups of households have more say in the allocation social safety net




Table 1: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes on
household access to RASKIN rice for poor program, propensity score matched sample,
using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
OPK/ RASKIN (Rice for poor program)
Purchased in last 12 months Per Capita Quantity (KG) Log Price per KG
Real, 2007 Rupiah
(| Purchased rice in last 4 weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake 0.122* 0.127* 0.347** 0.485** -0.123*** -0.130***
(0.065) (0.073) (0.170) (0.206) (0.041) (0.051)
Earthquake Area -0.022 0.046 0.106*
(0.064) (0.206) (0.061)
t2008 0.279 0.327** -0.579** -1.061*** -0.343*** -0.543***
(0.196) (0.105) (0.255) (0.402) (0.110) (0.130)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t2008 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,342 3,342 1,200 1,200 1,190 1,190
Number of hhid 1,738 910 900
R-squared within 0.17 0.166 0.286 0.156 0.312 0.528
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In all subsequent regression tables household controls include age of head, gender of head, years of schooling of head, marital
status of head, years in village of household head, household size.
Village controls include number of health posts, proportion of households with electricity, proportion of households with piped
water access to large and small microfinance institutions in village, village population, urban, number of earthquakes 2000-2005,
number of earthquakes 1975-1999.
Quantity of household purchase of subsidized rice in 2000 derived by dividing the estimated market value of rice purchased
through OPK by the average market price of rice. Subsidized price paid by household in 2000 is constructed by dividing the
estimated value of purchased subsidized rice by the estimated quantity. Note, for 2007, the quantity and price of subsidized
rice are actual reported values.
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Table 2: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes on
household access to RASKIN rice for poor program by within village wealth standing,
propensity score matched sample, using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
OPK/ RASKIN (Rice for poor program)
Purchased in last 12 months Per Capita Quantity (KG) Log Price per KG
Real, 2007 Rupiah
(| Purchased rice in last 4 weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.092 -0.116* 0.452** 0.519** -0.244*** -0.225***
(0.060) (0.067) (0.311) (0.236) (0.086) (0.083)
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* Moderately Poor t-1 0.138* 0.176* 0.481 0.122 0.093 0.191
(0.080) (0.098) (0.363) (0.229) (0.085) (0.159)
2008*Earthquake* Moderately Wealthy t-1 0.149* 0.203* -0.184 -0.261 0.06 0.003
(0.076) (0.107) (0.339) (0.386) (0.008) (0.112)
2008*Earthquake*Wealthiest t-1 0.182 0.245** -0.141 -0.767** 0.035 0.051
(0.117) (0.118) (0.398) (0.379) (0.101) (0.173)
Earthquake Area 0.046 0.178 0.116*
(0.085) (0.187) (0.052)
2008*Moderately Poor t-1 -0.061 -0.109* -0.042 -0.074 -0.071 -0.082
(0.070) (0.064) (0.277) (0.238) (0.045) (0.078)
2008* Moderately Wealthy t-1 -0117* -0.131** 0.188 0.262 -0.049 -0.029
(0.067) (0.063) (0.252) (0.258) (0.045) (0.076)
2008*Wealthiest t-1 -0.185** -0.195*** 0.304 0.221 -0.080* -0.136
(0.083) (0.069) (0.241) (0.320) (0.044) (0.091)
Earthquake*Moderately Poor t-1 -0.084 -0.037 -0.409 -0.269 -0.016 -0.091
(0.081) (0.095) (0.310) (0.302) (0.055) (0.112)
Earthquake* Moderately Wealthy t-1 -0.027 -0.007 -0.132 -0.278 0.002 0.121
(0.076) (0.094) (0.280) (0.296) (0.068) (0.114)
Earthquake*Wealthiest t-1 -0.208** -0.146 -0.595 -0.242 -0.06 -0.003
(0.085) (0.135) (0.506) (0.424) (0.069) (0.143)
Moderately Poor t-1 -0.003 0.008 0.148 0.304* 0.025 0.034
(0.051) (0.058) (0.189) (0.157) (0.034) (0.054)
Moderately Wealthy t-1 -0.164*** -0.134** -0.077 -0.237 -0.016 -0.009
(0.043) (0.063) (0.148) (0.197) (0.034) (0.065)
Wealthiest t-1 -0.153*** -0.158** 0.082 0.421* 0.003 0.048
(0.054) (0.066) (0.262) (0.244) (0.038) (0.097)
t2008 0.32 0.369*** 0.346 0.301 -0.284** -0.479***
(0.201) (0.127) (0.413) (0.612) (0.110) (0.146)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,342 3,342 1,200 1,200 1,190 1,190
Number of hhid 1,738 900 900
R-squared within 0.173 0.187 0.314 0.182 0.317 0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Quantity of
household purchase of subsidized rice in 2000 derived by dividing the estimated market value of rice purchased through OPK
by the average market price of rice.
Subsidized price paid by household in 2000 is constructed by dividing the estimated value of purchased subsidized rice by the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes on
household consumption smoothing, propensity score matched sample, using 2000 and
2008 balanced panel
Log Per Log Per Log Per Log Per Log Per
Capita Capita Capita Capita Capita
All Consumption Food Non Food 1 Non Food 2 Durables
(excl. durables) (| > 0 spending)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.105* -0.118** -0.102* -0.107** -0.082 -0.098* -0.217** -0.263** -0.306** -0.386**
(0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.092) (0.115) (0.152) (0.166)
Earthquake Area 0.017 0.004 -0.081 0.136 0.239
(0.056) (0.053) (0.078) (0.081) (0.265)
t2008 0.009 0.067 -0.042 -0.06 0.229*** 0.375*** -0.199*** -0.089 0.131 0.665**
(0.038) (0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.061) (0.057) (0.076) (0.097) (0.173) (0.265)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t2008 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 1,686 1,686
Number of hhid 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,239
R-squared within 0.263 0.123 0.228 0.134 0.300 0.221 0.194 0.128 0.085 0.054
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Results on
2008*Earthquake are robust to the inclusion of the 1998 panel. Household real per capita consumption exclude durables
consumption, 2000 data adjusted using CPI. Non-food1 expenditure (monthly) includes spending on 1)electricity, water, fuel,
tel etc., 2)personal toiletries, 3)household items, 4)domestic services(servants wages etc), 4)transport (gasoline, bus/cab fares
etc), 4)arisan 5)recreation & entertainment.
Non-food 2 expenditure (annual-converted monthly) includes 1)clothing for children and adults, 2)rituals, ceremonies, charities, gifts 3) taxes.
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes
on consumption smoothing by within village household wealth standing, propensity
score matched sample, using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
Log Per Log Per Log Per Log Per Log Per
Capita Capita Capita Capita Capita
All Consumption Food Non Food 1 Non Food 2 Durables
(excl. durables) (| > 0 spending)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.105 -0.124* -0.104 -0.11 -0.109 -0.124 -0.121 -0.244* 0.15 0.464
(0.075) (0.076) (0.120) (0.144) (0.136) (0.116) (0.111) (0.143) (0.241) (0.476)
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* 0.046 0.126 0.027 0.037 0.183 0.228 -0.128 -0.152 -0.419 -1.807*
Moderately Poor t-1 (0.118) (0.127) (0.135) (0.141) (0.197) (0.194) (0.178) (0.234) (0.654) (1.059)
2008*Earthquake* -0.234* -0.305** -0.114 -0.239* -0.168 -0.223 -0.290* -0.405*** -0.598 -2.326**
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (0.123) (0.151) (0.129) (0.136) (0.216) (0.263) (0.149) (0.167) (0.639) (0.957)
2008*Earthquake* -0.227 -0.285* -0.13 -0.154 -0.173 -0.187 -0.13 -0.355** -1.374** -2.342**
Wealthiest t-1 (0.153) (0.165) (0.153) (0.162) (0.123) (0.134) (0.129) (0.168) (0.622) (1.054)
Earthquake Area -0.087 -0.058 -0.146 0.118 0.308
(0.083) (0.081) (0.150) (0.150) (0.355)
2008* -0.046 -0.049 -0.005 -0.037 -0.023 -0.08 -0.181 -0.106 0.162 0.501
Moderately Poor t-1 (0.105) (0.118) (0.102) (0.119) (0.152) (0.183) (0.193) (0.210) (0.410) (0.786)
2008* -0.002 -0.034 -0.004 0.071 0.052 0.033 0.038 0.104 0.2 0.603
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (0.100) (0.111) (0.097) (0.107) (0.159) (0.192) (0.178) (0.143) (0.446) (0.647)
2008* -0.006 -0.097 -0.007 -0.126 0.057 0.039 -0.124 -0.154 -0.107 -0.326
Wealthiest t-1 (0.098) (0.115) (0.099) (0.109) (0.153) (0.196) (0.191) (0.232) (0.405) (0.608)
Earthquake* 0.164* 0.287** 0.083 0.190* 0.111 0.136 0.164 0.397 0.106 0.959
Moderately Poor t-1 (0.098) (0.115) (0.095) (0.105) (0.156) (0.197) (0.158) (0.241) (0.409) (0.904)
Earthquake* 0.160* 0.297** 0.109 0.218* 0.176 0.139 0.126 0.419* 0.183 2.221**
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (0.096) (0.116) (0.098) (0.116) (0.142) (0.194) (0.167) (0.233) (0.473) (1.017)
Earthquake* 0.094 0.158 0.220** 0.186 0.019 0.052 0.097 0.347 0.344 1.515
Wealthiest t-1 (0.107) (0.165) (0.109) (0.188) (0.165) (0.237) (0.190) (0.291) (0.425) (1.210)
Moderately Poor t-1 0.073 0.033 0.066 0.03 0.184** 0.115 0.245** 0.222* 0.089 0.225
(0.049) (0.080) (0.073) (0.077) (0.090) (0.121) (0.105) (0.135) (0.252) (0.571)
Moderately Wealthy t-1 0.286*** 0.05 0.246*** 0.048 0.480*** 0.118 0.550*** 0.182 0.38 0.904
(0.066) (0.084) (0.065) (0.068) (0.092) (0.123) (0.117) (0.160) (0.244) (0.609)
Wealthiest t-1 0.574*** 0.04 0.492*** 0.018 0.890*** 0.1 0.961*** 0.043 1.094*** 1.331**
(0.077) (0.104) (0.078) (0.123) (0.109) (0.141) (0.143) (0.184) (0.258) (0.654)
t2008 0.1 0.11 -0.044 0.05 0.16 0.379** -0.115 -0.54 0.049 0.241
(0.079) (0.097) (0.080) (0.097) (0.132) (0.159) (0.153) (0.690) (0.309) (0.611)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t2008 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 3,347 1,686 1,686
Number of hhid 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,239
R-squared within 0.316 0.149 0.268 0.161 0.358 0.229 0.236 0.141 0.104 0.094
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Results on
2008*Earthquake are robust to the inclusion of the 1998 panel. Household real per capita consumption exclude durables
consumption, 2000 data adjusted using CPI. Non-food1 expenditure (monthly) includes spending on 1)electricity, water, fuel,
tel etc., 2)personal toiletries, 3)household items, 4)domestic services(servants wages etc), 4)transport (gasoline, bus/cab fares
etc), 4)arisan 5)recreation & entertainment.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes on
assets by within village household wealth standing, propensity score matched sample,
using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
Total Value of Log Value of Land Log Value of
Assets, Real, Assets Ownership (not used Jewelry
(Rupiah, x10,000) for farm or nonfarm (|own jewelry)
business, 0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake 719.042 1,469.12 0.375 0.298 -0.032 -0.033 0.325 0.651
(1974.689) (1709.006) (0.277) (0.308) (0.080) (0.100) (0.367) (0.640)
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* -2,193.524* -1,753.57 -0.512* -0.375 -0.075 -0.155 -0.208 -0.225*
Moderately Poor t-1 (1279.879) (1617.544) (0.306) (0.364) (0.085) (0.113) (0.204) (0.130)
2008*Earthquake* -2,549.414** -2,419.800* -0.625** -0.644* -0.150** -0.257** -0.151 -0.297
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (1244.552) (1248.407) (0.308) (0.356) (0.075) (0.101) (0.422) (0.763)
2008*Earthquake* -5,879.707** -5,197.293* -0.646** -0.741* -0.145 -0.219 -0.559 -0.439
Wealthiest t-1 (2628.635) (3033.490) (0.314) (0.389) (0.095) (0.145) (0.468) (0.696)
Earthquake Area -1,657.81 -0.258 0.052 -0.429
(1073.856) (0.214) (0.063) (0.364)
2008* 957.649 2,249.58 -0.027 -0.107 0.044 0.091 -0.151 -1.510***
Moderately Poor t-1 (1071.728) (1419.956) (0.218) (0.279) (0.038) (0.071) (0.549) (0.549)
2008* 708.012 1,775.05 -0.057 -0.215 0.045 0.107 -0.452* -1.444**
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (1231.644) (1176.095) (0.174) (0.153) (0.056) (0.078) (0.254) (0.607)
2008* -618.168 -837.061 -0.115 -0.527* 0.049 0.037 -0.298 -1.550***
Wealthiest t-1 (1,762.590) (1,842.658) (0.224) (0.275) (0.065) (0.083) (0.309) (0.577)
Earthquake* 2,666.954** 3,094.00 0.632*** 0.785*** 0.085 0.122 0.513* 0.524
Moderately Poor t-1 (1,224.848) (1,962.338) (0.235) (0.276) (0.066) (0.092) (0.298) (0.685)
Earthquake* 1,406.77 3,362.81 0.502** 0.625** 0.086 0.031 0.531* 0.88
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (1,785.147) (3,316.138) (0.229) (0.295) (0.056) (0.089) (0.284) (0.599)
Earthquake* 4,762.98 2,727.62 0.486** 0.449 0.045 0.026 0.665* 0.728
Wealthiest t-1 (4,258.414) (5,412.760) (0.236) (0.362) (0.076) (0.126) (0.345) (0.675)
Moderately Poor t-1 757.057 1140.995 0.199 0.341 0.025 0.002 0.126 0.408
(651.269) (985.745) (0.169) (0.206) (0.044) (0.048) (0.182) (0.335)
Moderately Wealthy t-1 3,133.188*** 1,526.58 0.774*** 0.262 0.018 0.013 0.709*** 0.15
(1,733.032) (1,692.269) (0.161) (0.207) (0.045) (0.053) (0.201) (0.324)
Wealthiest t-1 8,607.498*** 1715.022 1.294*** 0.229 0.072 0.005 1.026*** 0.287
(1,692.577) (1,792.772) (0.175) (0.256) (0.048) (0.071) (0.224) (0.340)
t2008 -940.327 -236.993 0.15 0.365 -0.053 -0.073 0.139 0.199
(882.034) (956.583) (0.182) (0.237) (0.052) (0.072) (0.254) (0.301)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t2008 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,328 3,328 3,328 3,328 3,328 3,328 1,812 1,812
Number of hhid 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,252
R-squared within 0.189 0.033 0.286 0.065 0.09 0.137 0.242 0.048
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Results on
2008*Earthquake are robust to the inclusion of the 1998 panel. Household value of assets is the Rupiah value sum of house and
land occupied by household, other house or building, land (not used for farm non-farm business), poultry, livestock, vehicles,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Difference-in-Difference estimation of impact of exposure to earthquakes on
household access to OPK rice for poor program by pre-disaster number of community
groups in village, propensity score matched sample, using 2000 and 2008 balanced
pane
OPK/ RASKIN (Rice for poor program)
Purchased OPK rice in the last 12 months
Sample stratified at cutoff number of pre-disaster community groups
Groups≥4 Groups<5 Groups ≥3 Groups<4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.217* 0.225 -0.115* 0.22
(0.121) (0.190) (0.064) (0.247)
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* Moderately Poor t-1 0.136 0.175 0.262** 0.297*
(0.146) (0.167) (0.122) (0.156)
2008*Earthquake* Moderately Wealthy t-1 0.181 0.071 0.216* 0.208
(0.225) (0.202) (0.116) (0.264)
2008*Earthquake*Wealthiest t-1 0.357* -0.039 0.205* -0.057
(0.179) (0.167) (0.122) (0.212)
t2008 0.208 0.593*** 0.323* 0.432**
(0.230) (0.174) (0.165) (0.183)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES
HH FE YES YES YES YES
Province*t2008 FE YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,905 2,431 2,768 1,437
Number of hhid 0.214 0.209 0.199 0.202
R-squared within 1,358 1,529 1,636 1,091
Notes: Interactions - post-year (2008)*wealth level, earthquake*wealth level, and wealth standing -are not shown in the table
but included in the regressions, for clarity, and are available from author. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3 : Household within village wealth standing for 2000 sample, by pre-disaster 2000
assets, propensity score matched sample ? proportion affected by earthquake vs.
unaffected
HH in village unaffected by earthquake HH in village affected by earthquake
Poorest 207 96
Moderately Poor 371 187
Moderately Wealthy 408 193
Wealthiest 184 94
1,170 570
Figure A1. Number of IFLS villages exposed to at least one earthquakes over magnitude 5.5 in 25
to 50 km radius of epicenter
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Figure A.2 Number of IFLS villages exposed to at least one earthquakes over magnitude 5.5 in 50
to 75 km radius of epicenter
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A.4 : Robustness checks Difference-in-Difference estimation on household access
to RASKIN, sample excludes households in periphery of treatment group, propensity
score matched sample, using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
OPK/ RASKIN (Rice for poor program)
Purchased in last 12 months Per Capita Quantity (KG) Log Price per KG
Real, 2007 Rupiah
(| Purchased rice in last 4 weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment group: Households Exposed to Earthquake within 25 km of epicenter
(EXCLUDING HH IN PERIPHERY, 25-50 km)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.115 -0.129* 0.591* 0.810* -0.185* -0.319**
(0.082) (0.073) (0.331) (0.396) (0.094) (0.149)
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* 0.193** 0.202* 0.17 0.178 0.09 0.122
Moderately Poor t-1 (0.094) (0.104) (0.418) (0.430) (0.103) (0.173)
2008*Earthquake* 0.16 0.188* -0.286 -0.294 -0.175* -0.372**
Moderately Wealthy t-1 (0.099) (0.104) (0.307) (0.407) (0.098) (0.156)
2008*Earthquake* 0.178 0.200* -0.539 -0.547 0.047 0.046
Wealthiest t-1 (0.121) (0.113) (0.398) (0.379) (0.103) (0.200)
Earthquake Area 0.077 0.015 0.11
-0.121 -0.26 -0.07
t2008 0.339* 0.401** 0.129 0.647 -0.466** -0.915***
(0.177) (0.182) (0.341) (0.447) (0.192) (0.301)
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,930 2,930 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056
Number of hhid 1,603 829 829
R-squared within 0.231 0.143 0.313 0.225 0.321 0.551
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Interactions - post-year (2008)*wealth level, earthquake*wealth level, and wealth standing -are not shown in the table for clarity,
but included in the regressions, and are available from author.
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A.5 : Robustness checks Difference-in-Difference estimation on household access
to RASKIN, sample excludes households in periphery of treatment group, propensity
score matched sample, using 2000 and 2008 balanced panel
ARTIFICAL TREATMENT GROUP: HH Exposed to Earthquakes within 25-50 km
of epicenter (Excluding households within 25 km)
Purchased in last 12 months Per Capita Quantity (KG) Log Price per KG
Real, 2007 Rupiah
(| Purchased rice in last 4 weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake -0.069 -0.066 -0.28 -0.136 -0.089 -0.095
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* 0.069 0.051 -0.14 -0.224 -0.105 -0.365*
Moderately Poor t-1 -0.063 -0.094 -0.291 -0.171 -0.108 -0.205
2008*Earthquake* 0.06 0.033 0.219 0.192 -0.132 -0.454**
Moderately Wealthy t-1 -0.066 -0.091 -0.308 -0.32 -0.137 -0.239
2008*Earthquake* 0.123 0.125 0.417 0.452 -0170* -0.39
Wealthiest t-1 -0.108 -0.124 -0.372 -0.353 -0.091 -0.296
Earthquake Area -0.159 -0.188 -0.016
-0.163 -0.291 -0.16
t2008 0.178 0.127 0.425* 0.744 -0.573*** -0.691***
-0.119 -0.101 -0.218 -0.841 -0.196 -0.326
Observations 3,500 3,500 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
Number of hhid 1,876 916 916
R-squared within 0.202 0.183 0.277 0.169 0.282 0.505
ARTIFICAL TREATMENT GROUP: HH Exposed to Earthquakes within 50-75 km
of epicenter (Excluding households within 50 km)
Relative to No Earthquake Community
2008*Earthquake
-0.054 -0.061 -0.206 -0.148 -0.087 -0.122
Relative to Poorest Households within village* (at t-1)
2008*Earthquake* 0.076 0.134 -0.172 -0.255 -0.249** -0.254*
Moderately Poor t-1 -0.052 -0.097 -0.242 -0.214 -0.096 -0.147
2008*Earthquake* -0.117 -0.170* 0.18 0.075 -0.097 -0.077
Moderately Wealthy t-1 -0.085 -0.099 -0.295 -0.208 -0.098 -0.143
2008*Earthquake* 0.074 0.075 -0.185 -0.299 -0.136 -0.183
Wealthiest t-1 -0.095 -0.106 -0.21 -0.289 -0.111 -0.184
Earthquake Area 0.009 -0.257 -0.029
-0.07 -0.255 -0.058
t2008 0.125 0.118 0.584* 1.280** -0.580*** -1.123***
-0.125 -0.119 -0.314 -0.489 -0.141 -0.305
Observations 4,159 4,159 1,364 1,364 1,364 1,364
Number of hhid 2,252 1,038 1,038
R-squared within 0.205 0.189 0.258 0.341 0.25 0.576
HH Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Province*t FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village Clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Interactions - post-year (2008)*wealth level, earthquake*wealth level, and wealth standing -are not shown in the table for clarity,
but included in the regressions, and are available from author.
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1.10 Appendix B
In non-experimental causal studies, estimation of treatment effects usually requires an
adjustment using pre-treatment variables to reduce selection bias due to systematic
differences between the treated and control sample. Differences across any two treat-
ment and control units are captured using observable pre-treatment characteristics,
making the outcome orthogonal to treatment assignment conditional on observables.
Such a match can yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect (Dehejia &
Whaba, 2002). Several early studies on matching, including Rubin (1973), Cochran
& Rubin (1973), Raynor (1983), proposed matching based on just one variable or
weighting across a few selected variables. Subsequent work by Roesnbaum & Rubin
(1983) suggested the use of a propensity score, which creates a conditional probabil-
ity of assignment to a treatment group given a vector of observable covariates. Most
studies focus on Propensity Score Matching (PSM) because in many situations, the
dimensionality of observed characteristics is high (Dehejia & Whaba, 2002). Match-
ing along a small number of characteristics such as a binary match is straightforward,
however, when there are many variables PSM provides a means of weighting to yield
a treatment effect that is more accurate than for an unmatched sample.
In the context of this study, the source of non-randomness comes from the as-
signment to earthquake treatment. Since I measure short term effects of high impact
earthquakes, exposure is distributed over a few areas in the survey sample. These ar-
eas are likely to differ from unaffected areas making assignment to the treatment non-
random. The sample contains significantly more untreated units relative to treated
units. Hence, through PSM I narrow the untreated sample to units comparable to the
treated units along observable characteristics. Suppose EQhc is an indicator variable
equal to one if the community in which household h lives was affected by at least one
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earthquake over magnitude 5.5, within 25 km from 2006 to 2007. The EQhc variable
is equal to zero if the household lives in a community that was not affected by an
earthquake. Suppose Yhc1 is the value of the outcome of interest for household h in
community c when exposed to the treatment (EQhc = 1), and Yhc0 is the outcome
for the same household when not exposed (EQhc = 0) to the earthquake. Then the
treatment effect for household h in community c is defined as γhc= Yhc0- Yhc1. The
treatment effect of interest is the expected treatment effect for the treated population,
earthquake affected in this case:
γ|EQ=1 = E(γhc|EQhc = 1)
= E(Yhc1|EQhc = 1)− E(Yhc0|EQhc = 1)
As expected, E(Yhc0|EQhc = 1) is unobservable. While γehc = E(Yhc1|EQhc =
1)− E(Yhc0|EQhc = 0) can be estimated, it yields a biased estimator of γhc. Match-
ing along observable covariates can remove the associated bias in γehc.
The main identifying assumption required for matching is that of Conditional
Independence (CI) (Rubin, 1977): If for each unit hc we observe a vector of covari-
ates Xhc, Zc, and Yhc0 ‖ EQhc|Xhc, Zc, ∀hc, then the population treatment effect for
the treated γhc|EQhc = 1 is identified and equal to the treatment effect conditional on
observables X and Z, and assignment to treatment. Here, Xhc are observable house-
hold level characteristics and Zc are observable community level characteristics. This
condition intuitively states that conditional on observables X and Z, the distribution
of the potential outcome of interest for the treated in the absence of the treatment
is would have been the same as the untreated units. Thus under CI, assignment
to treatment conditional on observable characteristics can be considered as random,
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similar to randomized experimental design.
One way to estimate γhc|EQ,X,Z , is to stratify the sample into bins along ob-
servables of Xhc and Zc. However, as the number of observables increase the number
of cells increase exponentially and each cell may not contain both treatment and
control units. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) introduce the propensity score to re-
duce this dimensionality problem. The propensity score, denoted here as p(Xhc, Zc)=
Pr(EQhc = 1|Xhc, Zc)= E(EQhc|Xhc, Zc) is the probability of being treated (affected
by an earthquake) given Xhc and Zc . Conditional Independence immediately ex-
tends to the propensity score such that, (Yhc0,Yhc1,) ‖ EQhc|Xhc, Zc, ⇒ (Yhc0,Yhc1,)
‖ EQhc|p(Xhc, Zc).
Data from 2000 (IFLS3) is used as the baseline year in which to Propensity Score
Match (PSM) origin and split households from 2000 that remained within an IFLS
community (non-attrited) in 2008. I create a propensity score using a logit model.
IFLS3 is the preferred match survey as it allows a comparison of baseline survey
households. Households affected by an earthquake in the two years prior to the 2008
survey are matched to unaffected ones along several dimensions. The matched data
creates a balanced panel across the two survey years and allows me to establish a
parallel trend across control and treatment groups in outcomes prior to the disaster
using IFLS3 and IFLS2 data. In the sample, a household level propensity score is de-
termined using both household and village level characteristics, including dependent
variables at baseline. A match for a treatment household is derived using 4 nearest
neighbors, with replacement, if within a 0.15 caliper, with the top 5 percent of the
sample trimmed to avoid bad matches 23. This is likely the closest way to simulate
a randomized control trial using existing survey data. In the absence of earthquakes,
23Changing the matching technique does not affect the outcomes of the main analysis.
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access to safety net resources across affected and unaffected households run paral-
lel. Weighted difference-in-difference estimation is then carried out on the matched
sample.
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Chapter 2: Environmental Migration and Labor Markets in Nepal
Abstract
While an emerging literature cites weather shocks as migration determinants, scant
evidence exists on how such migration impacts the markets of receiving communities
in developing countries. We address this knowledge gap by investigating the impact
of weather-driven internal migration on labor markets in Nepal. An increase of 1 per-
centage point in net migration reduces wages in the formal sector by 4.8 percentage
points. The absence of wage effects in the informal sector is consistent with the exit
of low-skilled native workers from the labor market. Understanding entrepreneurial
constraints and drivers of labor market exits will inform pathways to resilience1.
JEL Classification: J21, J61, O15
Keywords: Environmental Migration, Weather, Conflict, Labor Markets, Nepal
1This chapter is a version of a paper with Jean-Francois Maystadt and Valerie Mueller.
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2.1 Introduction
Migration is understood to be a key mode of adaptation to extreme climatic events
(IPCC (2014)). Rural workers search for employment elsewhere to mitigate in-
come losses temporarily or move permanently if the damages are severe (Halliday
(2006);Feng et al. (2010); Dillion et al. (2011); Gray and Mueller (2012b) Gray and Mueller
(2012a); Marchiori et al. (2012); Gray and Bilsborrow. (2013); Bohra-Mishra et al.
(2014); Mueller et al. (2014)). An emerging challenge in the climate change debate
is to reconcile whether such adaptation bears additional consequences for human
security and livelihoods (IPCC (2014)).
Studies of the consequences of migratory flows on the labor markets of host-
ing communities in industrialized countries are ubiquitous (Card (1990);Card (2005);
Borjas (2005); Borjas (2006); Boustan et al. (2010); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Pugatch and Yang
(2011)). In developing countries, the issue has been investigated from the per-
spectives of either the migrants(Beegle et al. (2011); Grogger and Hanson (2011);
De Brauw et al. (2013)), their countries of origin (Adams and Page (2005); Hanson
(2009), for a review), or the households directly linked to migrants (Woodruff and Zenteno
(2007); Yang (2008)). Scant evidence exists on how internal migration impacts the
labor markets of receiving communities in developing countries, let alone the implica-
tions of disaster-driven migration (Kleemans and Magruder (2012); El Badaoui et al.
(2014); Strobl and Valfort (2013)). We address this knowledge gap by investigating
the impact of weather-driven migration on internal labor markets in a conflict-prone
country, Nepal.
Standard models predict immigration is detrimental to workers that show high de-
gree of substitutability with migrants (Johnson (1980a); Johnson (1980b); Altonji and Card
(1991); Borjas (2003); Card and Lemieux (2001); Borjas and Katz (2007); Ottaviano and Peri
(2012)). Migrants are implicitly assumed to be low skilled and to substitute natives
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with comparable skills. Recent work in Uganda supports these assertions (Strobl and Valfort
(2013)). Elsewhere, migrants are characterized as highly skilled, yet displace low-
skilled workers (Kleemans and Magruder (2012)). Kleemans and Magruder (2012)
speculated that binding constraints (such as minimum wage laws) in the formal
sector can create a wedge between formal- and informal-sector wages. These con-
ditions further render substitution effects more pronounced among disadvantaged
natives. Thus, immigration displaces low-skilled workers, causing a decline in the
wages of (less educated) native workers predominantly employed in the informal sec-
tor (Kleemans and Magruder (2012)).
Exposure to civil war2 and environmental degradation, and the linkages of these
factors to rural-urban migration3 render Nepal an interesting context in which to
study the spillover effects of adaptation, with a direct focus on nearby labor markets.
We apply the methodology of Boustan et al. (2010) to address biases inherent in
the immigration literature: the self-selection of migrants at origin, the selection of
migrant destinations, and native displacements. The methodology allows for the full
exploitation of bilateral migration flows in order to identify plausibly exogenous push
factors at origin and pull factors at destination. The instruments for the net migration
rate (predicted in-migration and out-migration rates) in the wage regression are based
on multiples of the predicted probability of moving bilaterally from one district to
another and the predicted bilateral (in- and out-) migration flows. These two factors
are predicted using models prior to the first stage. The first stage then uses two sets of
instruments for net migration: the constructed in- and out-migration rates jointly and
the net-migration rate derived from subtracting the first instrument from the first.
This is in direct contrast to earlier work which uses spatially lagged weather shocks
as instruments, raising concerns regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction due
2 Urbanization and labor markets have been affected by conflicts in other settings (Kondylis
(2010); Maystadt and Verwimp (2014); Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2012); Alix-Garcia et al. (2013)).
3 Environmental degradation and weather shocks have been argued to increase rural-urban mi-
gration in Nepal (Shrestha and Bhandari (2007); Massey et al. (2010)).
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to spatial spillovers resulting from these shocks.4
We provide a few modifications to the Boustan et al. (2010) methodology to im-
prove identification and adapt the methodology to the contextual setting of our study.
First, we model out- and in- migration flows between districts in Nepal (which are
later used to construct our instruments), accounting for lagged weather anomalies, in
addition to conflict and historical migration flows, and their interactions with river
density. Thus, we expand on the push-pull factors previously considered in the mi-
gration literature while introducing a dynamic estimation framework. Controlling
for historical migration flows is crucial to decipher the relative importance of natural
disasters and conflict events on immigration consequences. Second, we differentiate
consequences on the labor market by native worker skills to interpret the empiri-
cal findings in relation to theoretical predictions in the literature (Altonji and Card
(1991); Kleemans and Magruder (2012)).
Our dynamic model of out-migration (estimated prior to the first stage) indi-
cates weather extremes are a prominent driver of out-migration in Nepal, corrobo-
rating earlier work on environmental migration patterns (Gray and Mueller (2012a),
Mueller et al. (2014)). An increase by 1 standard deviation in the exposure to floods
(droughts) reduces out-migration rates by approximately 18 percent (20 percent) in
areas with mean river density. The effect of flooding is reversed for individuals in
areas densely populated with rivers. Increasing the number of conflict events by 1
standard deviation also encourages out-migration to a lower degree, by 6 percent.
Incorporating historical migration rates in a dynamic model provides two inter-
esting perspectives. First, including auxiliary controls is crucial in the environmental
migration literature, as their omission can bias parameter estimates. Second, it sug-
4 The problem of spatial spillovers is less of an issue when using approximations of shocks at origin
to study international migration (Munshi (2003); Pugatch and Yang (2011)), since shocks occur
outside the labor markets under investigation and the existence of spatial spillovers can be directly
tested. In our study of internal migration in Nepal, we will nonetheless follow Pugatch and Yang
(2011) to directly test the existence of spatial spillovers.
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gests that weather extremes are of equal importance to these omitted factors. An
increase of 1 standard deviation in the lagged out-migration rate increases future
out-migration rates by about 22 percent. The corresponding increase for in-migration
rates is even larger (at about 62 percent), reflecting strong network effects.
We find such prevailing factors push a more distinct group of individuals to migrate
(Kleemans and Magruder (2012); Strobl and Valfort (2013)). Approximately half of
the migrant population had completed 10 years of schooling, relative to 18 percent of
natives, in 2010. These high-skilled migrants potentially saturate the formal sector,
where one-fourth of natives are employed. These marked imbalances between the
characteristics of the migrants and of the native population accentuate wage effects
in the formal sector: an increase of 1 percentage point in net migration reduces wages
in the formal sector by 4.8 percentage points. Kleemans and Magruder (2012) report
an increase in the migrant share of the population by 1 percentage point reduces
overall income by 1.9 percentage points in Indonesia. Similarly, Altonji and Card
(1991) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find 1-2 percent declines in wages among low-
skilled workers in the United States. Card (1990), finds that the Mariel boat lift
from Cuba, which caused a 7% influx in Miami’s labor force, had small insignificant
impacts on wages and unemployment rates of low-skilled native workers. Borjas et al.
(1997) shows that new arrivals to a city can cause existing workforce to relocate,
spreading the costs of immigrations across a wider geographic area, thus minimizing
labor impacts. Differences between these studies and the results found in our study
could be driven by differences in the composition of the migrant population, where
our study finds that environmental and conflict driven migrants in Nepal are more
high-skilled.
Wage effects are concentrated in the formal sector, despite observed reductions
in the employment of natives in the informal sector. The absence of wage effects in
the informal sector is consistent with the exit of native workers from the informal
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labor market. We additionally show immigration largely leads to the unemployment
of low-skilled natives. An increase of 1 percentage point in net migration leads to an
increase of 1.5 percentage points in the unemployment of unskilled workers.
Our findings have implications for both the immigration and environmental mi-
gration literatures. First, migration is found to strongly affect labor outcomes in
hosting districts in Nepal. While migrants bring skills to host economies, their pres-
ence depresses the wages of workers in the formal sector (in contrast to the findings
of Kleemans and Magruder (2012) in Indonesia) and causes workers to exit the labor
market altogether. Second, our results suggest vulnerability to weather extremes is
not limited to those at the source of exposure. Conflict and flooding in areas populated
by rivers displace people. The vulnerability of populations in external communities
has spillover effects on migrant hubs. If the highly skilled workers are most affected,
reductions in their purchasing power likely incur losses to providers of their services
and goods. Understanding the constraints migrants face in starting their own enter-
prises and the drivers of labor market exits among the low-skilled natives will inform
pathways to labor market resilience.
2.2 Vulnerability and Labor Market Conditions in Nepal
Flooding is not uncommon in Nepal and can potentially lead to an increase in mi-
gration, away from rivers and toward low-lying land (Banister and Thapa (1981);
Shrestha (1999); Massey et al. (2010)). Our analysis covers periods of unprecedented
increases in the frequency and severity of floods and landslides (Figure 2.1). Small-
scale floods occurred (prior to 2002) followed by widespread exposure (in 47 districts),
displacing hundreds of thousands by 2002 (UN report 2002). The 2007 floods dis-
placed more than 19,000 households (Dartmouth Flood ObservatoryDartmouth Flood Observatory
(2014) data and the International Disaster Database,CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters)
(2014)). A flood of an even larger magnitude occurred in eastern Nepal in 2008 as a re-
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sult of a breach in an embankment at the Indo-Nepali border, displacing 42,000 house-
holds across several villages (UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(2008)). Flooding and landslides affected the far western and midwest regions during
the heavy monsoon period of 2009: 4,000 households were displaced and the food
stock of 25,000 families lost (UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(2009)).
Drought risk is rare and tends to occur during the winter, the regular monsoon
period. Western and eastern Nepal have experienced episodes of consecutive droughts
since 20005. These culminated in a severe drought over the period November 2008 to
February 2009, with precipitation 50 percent below the seasonal average (Wang et al.
(2013)).
Civil conflict was also a major factor driving migration in Nepal from 1999 to 2006
(Bohra-Mishra (2011)). A Maoist insurgency began in the Rolpa district in western
Nepal and much of the conflict was concentrated in mountainous and hilly terrain,
and in poorer areas. The decade-long conflict led to the loss of more than 13,000 lives
(Do and Iyer (2010)). There was considerable variation in the intensity of conflict
across the country;6 the Maoists controlled several districts in eastern and western
Nepal by 2005 (Murshed and Gates (2005)). Violent outbreaks led to the movement
of political refugees away from conflict-prone areas. The predicted probability of
migration decreased for moderate levels of violence and increased as violence became
more intense (Bohra-Mishra (2011)).
Local migration in Nepal driven by environmental and political factors is concen-
trated among more skilled and educated workers. Massey et al. (2010) found that
environmental decay, as indicated by falling agricultural productivity, serves to in-
crease the odds of local migration. Specifically, the odds of moving are significantly
higher for individuals with more years of schooling and holding salaried occupations,
5 See Figure A.1 in the appendix.
6 See Figure A.2 in the appendix.
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which is likely to indicate greater skill and therefore greater potential returns on hu-
man capital from migration. Among locally migrating adult males in Nepal compared
with non migrants, the former are younger and more educated (Fafchamps and Shilpi
(2013)). Similar to environmentally driven migration, within conflict areas, migrants
who move both within and across districts tend to be younger and more educated,
and to hold salaried jobs (Bohra-Mishra (2011)). These disparities across movers and
nonmovers increase when migration is across districts.
The above migration trends suggest displacement associated with environmental
disasters explains only a small portion of the mobility patterns in Nepal. Acknowl-
edging additional push-pull factors, such as conflict and economic drivers, is crucial to
provide an unbiased understanding of migration and its consequences on neighboring
districts. This fact influences our decision to modify the Boustan et al. (2010) identi-
fication strategy to incorporate conflict and a dynamic component to proxy additional
drivers of migration.
Previous work on environmental and conflict displacement suggests the relatively
skilled will tend to move out of district. Our study focuses on between-district migra-
tion and classifying workers by sector in our LSMS data, we observe both migrants
and non migrants tend to be employed in the informal sector (Table 2.1). However,
the share of migrants employed in the formal sector is larger than the share of non
migrants in this sector. A greater proportion engage in service-sector work; 39 per-
cent of migrants compared to 17 percent of non migrants in 2003 (Table 2.1). Non
migrants are also disproportionately employed in agriculture. While the agricultural
sector remains an important contributor to Nepal′s economy, from 1965 to 2010, the
share of gross domestic product accounted for by agriculture fell from 70 percent to
30 percent, while the share accounted for by services increased from 20 percent to
more than 50 percent (International Labor Organization (2010)). These trends sug-
gest that immigration is likely to affect services, the sector that employs the greatest
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share of migrants. Moreover, labor market adjustments following a shift in labor
supply may be constrained given the declining role of agriculture in the economy.
2.3 Data
Our analysis draws from several data sources. First, migration and employment
data are taken from two waves of the nationally representative Nepal Living Stan-
dards Survey (NLSS): 2003 and 2010. Second, we use the Armed Conflict Loca-
tion and Event Dataset (ACLED), which documents georeferenced conflict events
through 2010, to measure conflict exposure. Third, to create weather anomaly vari-
ables, we use 0.5×0.5 degree gridded satellite-based weather data provided by the
POWER (Predicted of Worldwide Energy Resource) project of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) of the United States for the years 1981 to
2013 (US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2014)). Fourth, gridded
population data are extrapolated from the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University. Fifth, river networks and geographic
characteristics (such as distance) are extracted from the United States Geological Sur-
vey HydroSHEDS (Hydrological Data and Maps Based on Shuttle Elevation Deriva-
tives at Multiple Scales dataset). 7 Below we elaborate on how our outcomes and
explanatory variables are constructed from the aforementioned datasets.
2.3.1 Definition of Variables
2.3.1.1 Migration
We create migration flows using the migration information of 7,000 and 14,000 in-
dividuals (residing in 3,954 and 5,556 households in 69 districts8) in 2003 and 2010,
7 The data source is: http : //hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov/index.php.
8 In total, six districts are excluded from our panel because they were omitted from the 2003 and
2010 surveys. In 2003, Accham, Mustang, and Rasuwa districts were unreachable due to conflict.
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respectively. Inflows are based on individuals who reported moving to district k from
district j in year t using NLSS sampling weights for population-based inferences. Bi-
lateral migration outflows are similarly defined. We restrict our focus to inflows and
outflows for four years preceding the 2003 and 2010 surveys to minimize the impact of
recall bias and ensure sufficient coverage of conflict and weather events in the period
observed.9 Population figures derived from the 1995 NLSS are then used to further
convert the migration flows into shares of migrants moving into and out of each dis-
trict k from each district j for each year. This procedure creates two 69×69 matrices
of bilateral in- and out-migration rates at the district level, which are used to predict
net migration rates, the key variable for the identification of the impact of migration
in the labor regressions.
2.3.1.2 Conflict
A conflict event is defined as a single altercation in which one or more groups use
force for a political end (Raleigh et al. (2010)). Following this definition, the number
of conflict events per square kilometer is defined by district-year for the four years
prior to 2003 and 2010. Between 1996 and 2006, the end of the civil war, about 3,030
conflict events were reported in the ACLED dataset for Nepal.
2.3.1.3 Weather Anomalies
We create seasonal flood and drought indicator variables, for the same period covering
migration flows, for each 1×1 degree grid that overlaps a district in a given year.
Heavy monsoon is from June to September. Regular monsoon is from November in
the previous year through February of the current year. A flood shock indicator, for
each grid in a given year, is set to 1 if cumulative rainfall over the heavy monsoon
Dolpa, Ilam, and Manang districts were omitted in 2010.
9 Modifying the number of years over which migration is observed has little impact on the
estimation of predicted migration rates.
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season exceeds the 90th percentile of the time-series distribution. Similarly, a drought
shock indicator, for each grid in a given year, is set to 1 if cumulative rainfall over
the regular monsoon season falls below the 10th percentile of the distribution.
Annual district-level flood and drought indicators are set to 1 if a flood or drought
occurs in any grid overlapping the district. The flood and drought variables are inter-
acted with river density data to capture an additional dimension of district exposure
to the weather anomalies. River density is calculated as the length of the river seg-
ments in kilometers divided by each district area.
2.3.1.4 Labor Market Outcomes
Our labor supply variables focus on the employment status of the individual. An
individual is considered employed if he reported working in the last 12 months prior
to the survey interview. Otherwise, the individual is categorized as unemployed (did
not work nor engage in domestic activities in the last 12 months) or inactive (did
engage in domestic activities in the last 12 months).
Two stratifications are made in the analysis to facilitate the interpretation of
results. The first stratification is based on the sector of employment, which relies on
the NLSS definition. We also stratify the sample by skill, whereby individuals having
more than 10 years of schooling are characterized as highly skilled and others are
considered low skilled.
Individual and household earnings over a 12-month period are used to construct
monthly formal- and informal-sector wages, respectively. We use the national con-
sumer price index to convert 2003 wages into 2010 real terms. Monthly wages for
formal-sector workers are taken directly from the survey. For the majority of work-
ers employed in the informal sector, we proxy for earnings with revenues from own
farms and enterprises. To construct individual monthly earnings, we divide monthly
revenues by the number of members in the household reported to be employed in the
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enterprise.
Our measure proxy for informal earnings may under- or overestimate true individ-
ual earnings in the informal sector. We might systematically overestimate revenues
per capita by omitting hired employees from the denominator (because they were
missing from the agricultural module). On the other hand, we may underestimate
individual earnings because we are unable to clarify which household members were
employed by the enterprise on a permanent basis.
Because household enterprises are more the rule than the exception, we restrict
the analysis of migration impacts to the sample of household heads. Particularly for
the informal sector, adding members from larger households may attenuate the effect
of immigration inasmuch as their employment status may depend on their relative
position in the household and other joint household decisions. Since restricting the
focus to household heads sufficiently reduces the initial sample size, we detail how
heads differ from the rest of the natives in the Summary Statistics section.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 compares the characteristics of migrants, nonmigrants, and household heads
of both groups in our sample. Migrants tend to be younger and more educated than
nonmigrants, and a greater percentage are women. The proportion of migrants that
completed 10 or more years of schooling is 29 percent, compared with 14 percent of
non-migrants in 2003. These differences widen by 2010, when 46 percent of migrants
are considered skilled according to our definition, compared with 18 percent of non-
migrants. Given the skill differentials, it is not surprising that a greater percentage
of migrants work in the formal sector.
Restricting the nonmigrant sample to household heads changes the distribution
of gender and age characteristics with negligible effects on educational endowment.
Focusing on the heads produces a sample closer to full employment. As expected,
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household heads obtain greater formal- and informal-sector wages on average (than
the complete sample of nonmigrants), and the difference is persistent over time.
2.4 Methodology
We employ the Boustan et al. (2010) methodology to account for changes in native
labor market outcomes attributable to immigration, using the following empirical
model:
Yijt = α1 + βMjt + λXijt + γQjt + δj + δt + εijt, t = [2003, 2010] (2.1)
The dependent variable Y represents the non-migrant labor outcomes (employed,
unemployed, and log monthly wages) for individual level i, living in area j at time
t. Labor supply and wage variables are a function of several factors: the net labor
migration rates M to area j over the last four years, a vector of demographic controls
X that reflect one′s earning potential (age, gender, education), a location variable Q
(urban destination), a location fixed effect δj to reflect labor market differences at
the regional level, and a time fixed effect δt to account for time trends. Errors are
clustered at the district level, for the 69 districts, to allow for correlation between
individuals within district-level labor markets.
To deal with the endogeneity of the net migration rate M , predicted in- and
out-migration rates are used as instruments for the observed net migration rates (
Boustan et al. (2010))10. We also subtract the predicted out-migration rate from the
predicted in-migration rate to create the predicted net migration rate and use this
one instrument for the net-migration rate. Thus we have two sets of instruments,
10 We follow Boustan et al. (2010) in how we compute the standard errors in the first- and second-
stage regressions. The first-stage regressions use block-bootstrapped standard errors (clustering at
the district level) to account for the fact that the predicted in- and out-migration rates are generated
regressors.
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predicted in- and out-migration rates together, or the predicted net migration rate as
an instrument for the net migration rate in a just identified model.
Equations (2) through (4) delineate how the predicted in-migration rate is com-
puted. Out-migration rates are calculated in a similar fashion to compute net migra-
tion rates (equations (5) through (7)). To compute the in-migration rate for location
j, we must first predict the in-migration flows, IMjt, of migrants to location j. This
is the product of the number of migrants leaving location k and the probability that
these migrants move from location k to location j, P̂kjt, where Ôkt denotes the out-
migration rate. The instrument for the in-migration rate is the predicted inflow in
equation (2) divided by district j′s population in 1995. Predicted in-migration flows
(equation (2)) are affected only by outmigration in all j states excluding own state k







× P̂kjt, with t = [2003, 2010] (2.2)
Okt = α2 + θ1Zkt−1 + θ2Mkt−1 + δk + δt + εkt, (2.3)
with t = [2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010]
Pkjt = α3 + φf(dkj) + δt + εkt, with t = [2003, 2010] (2.4)
In (3), we modify the out-migration rate, Okt, equation from Boustan et al. (2010)
and later Strobl and Valfort (2013) in three ways. First, the out-migration rate is in-
fluenced by origin weather shocks (floods, droughts and their interaction with river
density), as well as by past conflict events (Zkt−1)
12. Although the consistency of our
results does not depend on the addition of these interaction terms and the conflict
11The use of migration out of (into) other states excluding own state helps to avoid the issue
of endogeneity as discussed. In addition, excluding own state automatically implies excluding own
state lagged weather and conflict variables used in equation (3) and (6) to predict out(in) migration
flows which could indirectly affect the main dependent variables of the analysis.
12Weather and conflict variables are not used directly as instruments, only to construct predicted
in and out migration rates which are the excluded instruments used in the analysis
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variables, such modifications are motivated by the vulnerability of Nepali households
to floods, as described in Section 2.2. Second, we estimate out-migration flows using
a linear probability model with district and time fixed effects. Third, we improve
the predictive power of out-migration rates by estimating a dynamic model, incor-
porating lagged migration rates. A standard system generalized method of moments
(GMM) dynamic model (Blundell and Bond (1998)) is applied with robust standard
errors.13 The predictive power of the dynamic model is assessed against an alternative
model, ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors robust to time and spatial
correlation (Conley (1999)). We assume that spatial dependency disappears beyond
a cutoff point of 64 kilometers, which corresponds to the maximum distance between
the centroids of any pair of neighboring districts. We also allow for time dependency
of up to two years, which is larger than the minimum time lag (T powered 0.25)
recommended by Green (2003) and Hsiang (2010).
For each source location k, the probability of moving from location k to location j
is then estimated by a dyadic model in equation (4), which depends on the proximity
between locations k and j, djk. We define the proximity as a Euclidian distance
between locations and allow for a nonmonotonic relationship with the introduction of
a quadratic term. We estimate (4) using a linear probability model with time fixed
effects δt to account for unobserved time-specific variables that influence migration.
Standard errors are clustered at the origin level.
Thus far, we have explained how we predict in-migration rates. We must also
predict out-migration rates to have the complete set of variables used as excluded
instruments in equation (1) . Out-migration rates are computed in a similar fashion
13 The method provides more efficient estimates than difference GMM estimations
(Arellano and Bond (1991)) but requires an additional assumption with respect to stationarity. We
apply Fisher′ test for panel unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Maddala and Wu
(1999)). For our main variables reported in Table 5.2, we can reject the null hypothesis of nonsta-
tionarity in all variables at any reasonable confidence level. One exception is the number of conflicts
per square kilometer, but note that that our results do not depend on the inclusion of the conflict
variables (Table 5.1).
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× P̂jkt, with t = [2003, 2010] (2.5)
Ikt = α2 + θ1Zkt−1 + θ2Mkt−1 + δk + δt + εkt, (2.6)
with t = [2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010]
Pjkt = α3 + φf(djk) + δt + εkt, with t = [2003, 2010] (2.7)
Equation (5) denotes the predicted out-migration flow OMjt of migrants from
location j. The predicted out-migration flow from j is estimated as the sum over
all destination districts k (k 6= j) of the number of migrants settling in destination
district k who are estimated to come from source district j. Equation (6) provides
the predicted in-migration rate for districts estimated in a similar form to equation
(3). From (7), a function of distance across districts is used to estimate the likelihood
of individuals leaving source region j to move to region k. Predicted district level
observations of Pjkt and Ikt from equations (6) and (7) are used to create predicted
out-migration flows in (5). The predicted out-migration flow from location j is divided
by district j′s population in 1995 to create the predicted out-migration rate used as
an instrument, along with the predicted in-migration rate in the empirical estimation.
Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the predicted out-
migration rates, predicted in-migration rates and predicted net migration rate affect
individual labor market outcomes at the destination only through their effect on net
migration.14 By focusing on district-level migration rates, we essentially reduce the
potential for the exclusion restriction to be violated due to the spatial correlation of
shocks across cities and villages within the same district. Furthermore, by including
district fixed effects, we control for unobserved factors at the destination that might
14 The average net migration rate (Table 5.2) is slightly lower than rates observed in the US
literature but within the realm for internal migration in developing countries (Strobl and Valfort
(2013)).
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be correlated with net migration and affect labor market outcomes.
The only credible threat to identification would come from spatial correlation be-
tween the variables used to predict net-migration rates from sending districts and
unobserved local labor market conditions at the district level ( Boustan et al. (2010);
Pugatch and Yang (2011)). This is certainly one rationale for lagging these variables
when predicting in- and out-migration. Yet we cannot rule out that (lagged) political
and environmental shocks are correlated across districts and feature enough persis-
tency to threaten the validity of the exclusion restriction. We will therefore test the
robustness of our analysis in Section 2.5.3 by augmenting the regressions in equation
(1) with spatially lagged political and environmental shocks that explicitly control
for spatial correlation across districts.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results from the Regressions Used to Predict Net Migration
Rates
We first present the parameter and standard error estimates from the OLS version
of (3) (column 3, Table 5.1). An increase of 1 standard deviation (that is, by 0.387)
in flood incidence during the heavy monsoon (i.e. 0.387) reduces the out-migration
rate by 0.0009 (at mean river density).15 Given the mean value of the out-migration
rate (0.005), the impact corresponds to a reduction of 18 percent. However, flood
exposure, particularly in areas with dense river networks (floods*river density), can
push individuals out of their locations of origin. For example, consider individuals
living in areas where the river density is 2 standard deviations above the mean.
An increase of 1 standard deviation in flood incidence elevates their chance of out-
15 Descriptive statistics for district-level variables, which are used to compute the average partial
effects, are given in Table 5.2.
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migration by 3 percent.
Inferences on the flooding parameters are similar when based on the dynamic
model (column 6, Table 5.1). At the cost of imposing an additional assumption with
respect to the exogenous nature of past migration,16, the dynamic model is found
to offer a better specification fit. The F-test of joint significance in the first-stage
equation is slightly higher for the instruments resulting from the dynamic model.
Our instrumental variables (predicted migration rates) and the interpretation of the
remaining parameters are therefore based on our preferred specification, the dynamic
model.
A major advantage of the dynamic model is the ability to control for auxiliary
factors that affect historical migration rates. To give perspective on the relative im-
portance of flooding on out-migration rates, auxiliary factors, as proxied through the
lagged out-migration rate, influence out-migration rates by a similar order of magni-
tude. An increase of 1 standard deviation in historical out-migration rate augments
out-migration rates by 22 percent compared with an 18 percent reduction from an
equivalent increase in flooding exposure. While the number of conflicts also has a con-
sistently positive effect on out-migration rates, the effects are smaller with an increase
of 1 standard deviation, leading to a 6 percent increase in out-migration rates.
We briefly remark on the in-migration rate regression (column 12, Table 5.1).
Lagged migration is the only statistically significant determinant. An increase of 1
standard deviation in historical in-migration rates is predicted to increase in-migration
by 62 percent, reflecting strong network effects.
We next turn to the models used to predict the probabilities of moving from
district k to j and vice versa (4). Both specifications suggest a convex relationship
between the probability of moving and distance: the probability is almost always
16 To validate the consistency of the GMM estimator, the test for the first-order serial correlation
rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation, while the hypothesis for second-order serial correlation
cannot be rejected. The Sargan test for over identification does not reject the null hypothesis of zero
correlation between the instrumental variables and the error term.
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negatively correlated with the linear term (for 124 and 127 of the 138 estimated pairs
in Pkj and Pjk, respectively) and positively correlated with the squared term (for
132 and 136 of the 138 estimated pairs in the same two specifications). The small
sample of district pairs, however, influences the precision of our estimates. About 25
percent of the coefficients on the linear and squared distance variables are statistically
significant at the 10 percent critical level in both probability specifications.
Table 5.3 presents the results from the first-stage regressions. Predicted migration
rates calculated from formula (2) for in-migration (and a similar formula for out-
migration) are used as instruments for actual net migration rates. We also provide a
just-identified version of the first stage, using the predicted net migration rate as one
instrument subtracting the aforementioned two formulas.
Figure 5.1 maps the predicted and observed net migration rates. Although strongly
correlated in areas with major cities, the two maps substantially differ in that the
predicted figures capture a subsample of the observed net migration rates. For Kath-
mandu, actual and predicted net-migration rates are strongly correlated. Actual net
migration rates were 0.020 and 0.117, while predicted net migration rates were 0.023
and 0.064 in 2003 and 2010, respectively. In other cities, such as Nepalganj in the
southwestern Banke district (Figure 5.1), the distinction between actual and pre-
dicted migration is much larger. The actual net migration rate is 0.046 and 0.010 in
contrast to the predicted net migration rate of -0.003 and -0.004 in 2003 and 2010,
respectively. The striking differences across predicted and observed net migration
rates highlight that the interpretation of our results is not generalizable to any type
of migrants in Nepal.
2.5.2 Impact of Migration on Hosting Labor Markets
We now present our estimates of the impact of net migration rates on labor markets
outcomes. In Table 5.4, our dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly real wage,
85
distinguishing between the formal and informal sectors. The two-stage least-squares
estimates under just-identified (column 5) or over identified (column 6) equations
indicate a strong negative impact in the formal sector. A 1 percent increase in net
migration rates would translate into a fall in real wages by about 5 percent. Contrary
to the findings of Kleemans and Magruder (2012), the negative impact is found only
in the formal sector. These effects are consistent with migrants’ being engaged in
activities in the formal sector more than nonmigrants.
The formal-sector wage effects for each district are extrapolated from the regres-
sion results and presented in Figure 5.2. A 1 percent increase in net migration rates
from increased frequency of droughts, floods, and conflict in this part of the world
is expected to have profound effects on the economic geography of Nepal. There is
quite a bit of variation in the wage effects across space which corresponds to district
migration hot spots depicted in Figure 5.1, which suffers the most negative conse-
quences.
Our descriptive statistics also reveal that the difference between migrants and non-
migrants may be driven by distinctions in skills: in 2010, 46 percent of migrants were
considered skilled compared with 18 percent of nonmigrants. It is therefore not sur-
prising to observe that net migration negatively affects the real wages of high-skilled
nonmigrants (columns 1-3, Panel A, Table 5.5), in particular in the formal sector
where most (relatively) high-skilled migrants are competing (columns 7-9, Panel B,
Table 5.5). The magnitude of the wage effect resembles wage losses in the context of
labor substitutability among low-skilled workers in the United States (for example,
1-2 percent declines found by Altonji and Card (1991) or Ottaviano and Peri (2012)).
Nonetheless, the negative impact found in the formal sector for the low-skilled workers
(columns 10-12, Panel B, Table 5.5) sheds doubt on a mechanism exclusively based
on labor substitutability.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 point to another source of vulnerability for low-skilled work-
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ers. Low-skilled workers face a lower probability of employment (columns 14 and
15, Table 5.6) and a higher probability of unemployment (columns 8 and 9, Table
5.7). Raising net migration by 1 percentage point increases the unemployment of un-
skilled workers by 1.5 percentage points. A slightly lower (reverse) elasticity is found
for employment probability. Similarly, employment and unemployment probabilities
have the expected sign for skilled workers, although statistically significant for the
probability to be unemployed (columns 5 and 6, Table 5.7). Such contrasting results
are consistent with a displacement of low-skilled workers out of the labor market.
2.5.3 Validity of the Instruments
The identification strategy hinges on two main identifying assumptions: the strength
and the exogenous nature of the predicted net migration rates used as instruments.
First, the individual t- and F-tests, assuming weak instruments, indicate the instru-
ments are strong predictors of the actual net migration rate (Table 5.3). The Kleiber-
gen Paap rk Wald F statistics range between 12 and 14 for our preferred dynamic
specification, which exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values with 15 percent
absolute bias.17 We also note that the predicted net migration rates positively affect
observed net migration rates, which is reassuring given that just-identified estimates
are median-unbiased.
Second, it is intuitively plausible that the predicted migration rates affect labor
market outcomes only through observed migration rates. In Section 2.4, we rational-
ize the focus of the analysis at the district level and the use of lagged environmental
and political shocks in predicting migration rates to satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion. One possible violation of the exclusion restriction would nonetheless result if
(weather and political) shocks in neighboring districts have direct impacts on labor
17 The F statistics on excluded IV is also above the rule-of-thumb of 10 provided by Stock and Yogo
(2005). We also note that when using the predicted out-migration and in-migration rates as separate
instruments, the Hansen J test features a p-value above 0.100. It should be noted that the two
instruments are similar in nature and the test assumes that at least one instrument is valid.
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market outcomes.18 We therefore test the stability of our coefficients of interest in the
second-stage regressions to the inclusion of spatially lagged variables. The spatially
lagged variables are obtained by multiplying the variables used to predict migration
in equation (3) with a distance-based spatial matrix that weights the value of each
variable for one district by the inverses of the Euclidean distances to the geographical
centers of all other districts (Anselin (2002)). The inclusion of these spatially lagged
variables does not alter substantially the magnitude of the impact of migration on
labor market outcomes.19 We can therefore rule out the possible threat to our iden-
tification strategy that would result from spatial spillovers from environmental and
political shocks.
2.5.4 Reflections on the Role of the Informal Labor Market in Ab-
sorbing Displaced Workers
The seemingly contrasting results between employment and wage outcomes deserve
further investigation. The displacement of low-skilled workers out of the labor market
cannot be explained by the labor substitution mechanism. First, immigration may
change demand in ways differentially affecting formal- and informal-sector workers
(Altonji and Card (1991)). For example, a growing literature demonstrates immi-
gration influences prices and consumption composition (Saiz (2003)Saiz (2007); Lach
(2007); Cortes (2008)). Second, although our findings are somewhat consistent with
the predictions of Kleemans and Magruder (2012), our informal-sector results sug-
gest binding constraints preclude the absorption of workers (for example, registration
18 Past migration in equation (3) may also be endogenous. Our results are similar when past
migration is omitted and the instruments are constructed using an OLS estimation (as shown in
columns 1-3 and 7-9 in Table 5.1). The robustness of the two-stage estimates is provided in Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
19 Results are provided in Table A.3. There is only one exception : the impact on wages for the
low-skilled workers appears to be positive when spatially lagged variables are included. However,
when restricted to the formal sector, we found a negative impact, similar to the one found in Table
5.5 (columns 11-12).
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requirements may prevent the entry of new enterprises, or credit constraints prevent
enterprise expansion). We reflect on the plausibility of these hypotheses descrip-
tively.20
We first examine whether native workers change their consumption patterns in
response to migrant flows. It is important to note that the general equilibrium frame-
work developed by Altonji and Card (1991) accounts for the increase in the demand
for goods caused by the shift in the population from migration. We explore an ad-
ditional effect on labor demand, which is through shifts in preferences for goods. If
the purchasing power parity of workers declines with immigration, then we might ex-
pect to observe changes in consumption patterns. While total consumption remains
unaffected by migration, native workers reduce the share of service goods consumed
in exchange for other nonfood essentials (Table 5.8). These compositional changes in
demand do not explain labor market exits in the informal sector, but they do offer
one explanation for why formal-sector workers are at most risk. A greater share of
formal-sector workers are engaged in the service sector, in which services are likely to
have a higher elasticity of demand.
We next assess how constraints on the creation and expansion of enterprises may
affect the ability of the informal sector to absorb displaced workers. Descriptive
statistics indicate that the majority of enterprises are financed through households’
own savings (approximately 40 percent) (Table 5.9). Only a small percentage of
enterprises tried to obtain a loan to operate or expand their business (23 percent
in 2010) and fewer complained of unsuccessful attempts (3 percent). Overall, the
environment for hired labor is low (for example, only 17 percent in 2010). Informal
20 These hypotheses are by no means exhaustive. The skilled may be differentially affected if
migration affects innovation and technology boosting their marginal productivity (Kerr (2013)).
Additionally, from a worker’s perspective, the returns to his skills or education in the informal sector
may be lower than his reservation wage, rendering unemployment more desirable than employment
in the informal sector. Although testing the role of migration in innovation is beyond the scope of the
paper, we find no descriptive evidence to support the reservation wage argument when comparing
the returns on education across sectors in simple Mincerian wage regressions (Table A.4 in the
appendix).
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enterprises are more inclined to hire workers and a significantly greater number of
workers per enterprise. The absence of financial capital may discourage enterprises
in the informal sector from expanding or entrepreneurs from creating start-ups.
2.6 Conclusion
We employ the Boustan et al. (2010) multi-stage procedure to identify the effects of
environmental migration on the labor markets of hosting communities. We modify
these authors’ procedure for constructing the instrumental variables to incorporate
additional variables relevant to our setting (such as conflict exposure), district and
time fixed effects, and a dynamic component. We show the dynamic model is preferred
to the standard OLS accounting for spatial and time correlation (Conley (1999)). In-
ferences based on the dynamic model suggest droughts and floods are equally crucial
determinants of migration as auxiliary factors, proxied by lagged migration. Predic-
tions from the dynamic model are used to construct instruments for net migration
rates in the second stage.
Our second-stage regressions indicate wage losses are slightly larger than those
observed in the United States and elsewhere (4.8 percent). Labor substitution is
imperfect in the Nepal case inasmuch as migrants appear more skilled than the av-
erage native worker in hosting communities. The demand for labor in the formal
sector also appears binding in the short term following earlier work in Indonesia
(Kleemans and Magruder (2012)). Imperfect substitution coupled with fixed labor
demand in the formal sector may partially explain why wage losses are more pro-
nounced here than in other settings.
Although migrants are positively selected, as in Indonesia, we find informal-sector
employment (not wages) is negatively affected. The wages of the informal sector
adjust due to the exit of workers from the labor market. Migration appears to change
consumption patterns by reducing the share of service goods consumed. Service goods
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may have a higher elasticity of demand. Furthermore, formal-sector workers are at
greater risk than informal-sector workers since a greater share are employed in the
service sector. The informal sector’s ability to absorb excess labor may also be limited
by opportunities to access financial capital in Nepal to support new enterprises or
encourage older enterprises to grow. Such descriptive evidence suggests the provision
of grants to support enterprises following periods of disasters may foster resilience in
hosting economies to forced migration (de Mel et al. (2012)).
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Table 2.1—Summary statistics, individual characteristics of migrants and natives aged
18-65, weighted, 2003 and 2010
2003 2010 2003 2010
Non- Migrant Diff. Non- Migrant Diff. Non- Non-
migrant migrant migrant migrant
(p-val) (p-val) HH head HH head
(n = 7,303) (n = 241) (n = 14,367) (n = 401) (n = 2,742) (n = 5,230)
Age 36.70 28.50 0.000 37.80 25.70 0.000 43.40 43.70
(13.60) (11.60) (13.60) (10.10) (11.60) (11.50)
Male 0.53 0.43 0.000 0.43 0.24 0.000 0.85 0.72
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.36) (0.45)
Schooling 3.69 6.52 0.000 4.25 8.24 0.000 3.36 3.98
(4.57) (4.71) (4.81) (4.58) (4.36) (4.51)
Highly skilled 0.14 0.29 0.174 0.18 0.46 0.000 0.12 0.14
(0.34) (0.46) (0.39) (0.50) (0.32) (0.35)
Labor Variables
Employed 0.90 0.75 0.358 0.84 0.58 0.152 0.97 0.94
(last 12 months) (0.30) (0.43) (0.37) (0.50) (0.17) (0.24)
Unemployed 0.03 0.07 0.000 0.13 0.26 0.000 0.01 0.06
(last 12 months) (0.18) (0.25) (0.34) (0.44) (0.12) (0.23)
Inactive 0.07 0.18 0.000 0.03 0.16 0.375 0.02 0.004
(last 12 months) (0.25) (0.39) (0.17) (0.37) (0.13) (0.06)
(n = 6,572) (n = 180) (n = 12,068) (n = 233) (n = 2,660) (n = 4,707)
Work primary job 0.26 0.32 0.084 0.20 0.27 0.027 0.31 0.23
(|empl. in formal) (0.44) (0.47) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46) (0.42)
(n = 1708) (n = 57) (n = 2,413) (n = 63) (n = 798) (n = 1,080)
Real wage 10,276 10,221 0.996 13,445 8,653 0.569 14,765 17,582
(|empl. & formal) (80,981) (18,267) (63,605) (8,107) (114,300) (89,454)
(n = 2,713) (n = 84) (n = 5,700) (n = 75) (n = 1,323) (n = 2,034)
Real wage1 1,566 1,584 0.912 3,245 4,049 0.783 1,890 3,676
(|empl. & informal) (5,561) (2,919) (24,501) (10,973) (7,301) (27,204)
Share of Migrants by Industry
(n = 5,960) (n = 151) (n = 9,901) (n = 173) (n = 2,484) (n = 4,264)
Agriculture, 0.70 0.52 0.71 0.53 0.70 0.67
Forestry & Fishery (0.46) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.46) (0.47)
Services 0.17 0.39 0.20 0.35 0.18 0.22
(0.38) (0.49) (0.40) (0.48) (0.38) (0.41)
Manufacturing 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.26) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23)
Construction 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06
(0.21) (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Notes: Real wages expressed at the monthly level in 2010 rupees. Highly skilled is defined as having
10 or more years of schooling. HH = Household. 1 Real monthly wage for individual in informal sector
constructed using agricultural or enterprise revenues per worker. 2 Real monthly wage for Household


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2—Descriptive statistics for district-level variables, periods 2000 to 2003 and
2007 to 2010 (districts = 69, n = 552)
Mean St. dev. Fisher’s test
Flood during heavy monsoon (unweighted) 0.183 (0.387) 329***
Drought during heavy monsoon (unweighted) 0.308 (0.462) 443***
Total conflicts per square km 0.002 (0.009) 120
River density (length of river per square km) 0.171 (0.023) 343***
Actual migration outflow rate from district 0.005 (0.007) 358***
Actual migration inflow rate to district 0.003 (0.005) 329***
Aggregate actual net migration rate (cum. 4-year) 0.005 (0.031)
(weighted by sample size in each district)
Note: ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Table 5.3—Relationship between predicted and actual migration rates (first stage)
Actual net migration rate
Dependent variable Dynamic model OLS model
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Predicted net migration rate 1.459*** 2.107***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.533) (0.668)
Predicted out migration rate -0.580** -4.829
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.241) (5.123)
Predicted in migration rate 1.918*** 2.165**
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.672) (0.862)
Individual age -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual male 0.00008 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual education years -0.0000 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban 0.00015 0.00017 0.00025 0.00034
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 24.235 24.235 24.235 24.235
R-Squared 0.598 0.652 0.646 0.652
Number of districts 69 69 69 69
F-stat 58.28*** 63.92*** 61.67*** 64.5***
F-stat on excl. IV 13.86*** 12.53*** 23.003*** 13.34***
Weak identification testa 13.784 12.464 22.861 13.223
Stock-Yogo critical values
10 percent maximal IV size 16.380 19.930 16.380 19.930
15 percent maximal IV size 8.960 11.590 8.960 11.590
Notes: Time and district fixed effects are included. a The weak identification
test provides the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped and clustered at the district level.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5—Effect of net migration rate on wages for nonmigrant household heads
aged 18-65, by skill (second stage)
Dependent Variable Log monthly real wages (2010 Nepal rupees)
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A All sectors
High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -1.940* -1.253 -1.202 -0.6378 4.615 3.431
(cumulative 4-yr) (1.068) (1.453) (1.438) (1.133) (4.638) (3.961)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154 4,154
R-squared (within) 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.480 0.478 0.479
Panel B Formal sector
High skill Low skill
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate -1.675** -1.518* -1.593** -5.397*** -4.655*** -5.376***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.705) (0.818) (0.790) (0.745) (1.326) (0.939)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 573 573 573 1,530 1,530 1,530
R-squared (within) 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.250 0.250 0.250
Number of districts 45 45 45 66 66 66
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district
level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. High skill refers to those























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.8—Effect of net migration rate on nonmigrant household expenditure patterns
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A Log per capita total Share food expenditures
Expenditures (real 2010 rupees) (real 2010 rupees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -0.549 1.133 1.105 0.003 0.031 0.016
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.436) (1.504) (1.539) (0.146) (0.163) (0.167)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
R-squared (within) 0.449 0.447 0.447 0.242 0.242 0.242
Number of districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
OLS IV(1) IV(2) OLS IV(1) IV(2)
Panel B Share nonfood expenditures Share services expenditure
excl. services (real 2010 rupees) (real 2010 rupees)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate 0.555*** 0.855*** 0.879*** -0.558** -0.886*** -0.895***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.117) (0.188) (0.191) (0.225) (0.147) (0.126)
Individual control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
R-squared (within) 0.356 0.355 0.354 0.065 0.064 0.063
Number of districts 69 69 69 69 69 69
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district level,
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5.9—Nonmigrant household financial and capacity constraints of enterprises (
| own enterprise), weighted, 2003 and 2010
2003 2010 2003 2010
All All Low High Low High
skill skill skill skill
(n=865) (n = 1,854) (n = 695) (n = 170) (n = 1,469) (n = 385)
Is the enterprise registered 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.48
with the govermnent? (yes) (0.40) (0.41) (0.35) (0.50) (0.36) (0.50)
What was the main source of money for setting up the enterprise?
Didn’t need any money 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.21 0.35 0.20
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48) (0.40)
Own savings 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.53 0.37 0.41
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
Relatives or friends 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.16
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (0.34) (0.37)
Bank (agricultural, 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11
commercial, Grameen type) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.31)
Other financial institution 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08
(0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.27)
Other 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21)
Have you tried to borrow money to operate or expand your business in the past 12 months? (relative to no)
Yes, successfully 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.31
(0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.47)
Yes, unsuccessfully 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20)
Did you hire anyone over 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.30 0.14 0.35
the past 12 months? (yes) (0.34) (0.38) (0.31) (0.46) (0.34) (0.49)
How many workers do you normally hire during a month when the enterprise is operating?
( | hired in last 12 months) 8.88 9.98 4.99 17.80 11.00 7.84
(32.10) (38.60) (20.60) (48.20) (42.80) (28.40)
What problems, if any, do you have in running your business?
No major problem 0.35 0.49 0.36 0.30 0.51 0.38
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49)
Caiptal or credit problem 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.16
(0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.41) (0.33) (0.36)
Lack of customers 0.31 0.14 0.32 0.24 0.13 0.17
(0.46) (0.34) (0.47) (0.43) (0.34) (0.37)
Other 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.30






































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2—Effect of net migration rate on wages using alternate instruments derived
from adjusted OLS method for nonmigrant household heads aged 18-65, by skill
(second stage)
Dependent Variable Log monthly real wages (2010 Nepal rupees)
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A All sectors
High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net migration rate -1.444 -1.794 2.403 2.309
(cumulative 4-yr) (1.368) (1.229) (3.405) (3.359)
Individual control Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154
R-squared (within) 0.464 0.464 0.479 0.480
Number of districts 60 60 69 69
Panel B Formal sector
High skill Low skill
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Net migration rate -1.7355** -1.7758** -5.8440*** -5.9253***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.807) (0.808) (0.828) (0.803)
Individual control Y Y Y Y
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 573 573 1,530 1,530
R-squared (within) 0.171 0.171 0.250 0.250
Number of districts 45 45 66 66
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors , clustered
at the district level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
High skill refers to those individuals with at least 10 years of education.
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Table A.3—Testing exclusion restrictions, including spatially lagged weather shock
and climate variables in own district
IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2) IV(1) IV(2)
Panel A Log monthly real wage (2010 Nepal rupees)
Formal High skill Low skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net migration rate -4.005* -4.107** -7.070 -4.136 18.839*** 19.976***
(cumulative 4-yr) (2.209) (2.041) (8.189) (9.021) (6.931) (7.142)
Observations 2,120 2,120 1,075 1,075 4,154 4,154
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.112 0.112 0.114 0.113
Number of districts 67 67 60 60 69 69
Panel B Employed (worked in last 12 months)
Formal sector High skill Low skill
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Net migration rate 1.240* 1.497* -1.668* -1.551* -0.956** -1.008***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.739) (0.829) (0.916) (0.890) (0.377) (0.380)
Observations 7,967 7,967 1,358 1,358 6,604 6,604
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.090
Number of districts 69 69 64 64 69 69
Panel C Unemployed (worked in last 12 months)
All High skill Low skill
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Net migration rate 1.319*** 1.383*** 1.950** 1.860** 1.305*** 1.381***
(cumulative 4-yr) (0.363) (0.378) (0.850) (0.872) (0.395) (0.406)
Observations 7,965 7,965 1,358 1,358 6,604 6,604
R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.103 0.103 0.079 0.078
Number of districts 69 69 64 64 69 69
Included in Panels A, B, and C
Spatially lagged variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
HH head controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Time and district fixed effects included. Standard errors, clustered at the district level,
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Spatially lagged variables include



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Crop Loss and Youth Labor
and Schooling Outcomes in Tanzania
Abstract
I investigate the relationship between transitory income shocks and youth labor and
schooling outcomes. I find that crop shocks increase labor significantly among youth
aged 14 to 19 and increase the probability that youth enrolled in school miss school
by 13 –18%. The observed impacts on youth predominantly affect female youth.
Labor across female and male youth is approximately equivalent among unaffected
households. I find that youth not enrolled in school are more likely to take up paid
employment as a result of crop shocks. Youth enrolled in school on the other hand,
substitute in for unpaid labor and participation in household chores. Further, com-
paring youth and children, I find that while youth schooling outcomes are affected, I
find no similar effects among children aged 7 to 13.
JEL Classification:J22; J82; I25
Keywords: Crop loss, Youth labor, Youth schooling
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3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of crop loss 1 on labor and schooling outcomes
for youth. I define youth as secondary school aged individuals between 14 and 19
years, and children as primary aged between 7 and 13 years. I subsequently compare
differences in household choices of labor allocation between youth and children, given
such shocks. While a growing body of literature examines the causes and consequences
of child labor (Jensen (2000b), Ranjan (2001), Beegle et al. (2006), de Janvry et al.
(2006), Edmonds (2006), Kruger (2007), Hazarika and Sarangi (2008)), very little
is known about the economic impact of transitory shocks on secondary school aged
youth in developing countries.
Transitory shocks could increase youth labor supply and reduce participation and
performance in school, contributing to lower long-term human capital accumula-
tion similar to childhood exposure (Beegle et al. (2007), Maccini and Yang (2009),
Psacharopoulos (1997)). Schooling enrollment among youth in Sub-Saharan African
countries like Tanzania remain particularly low. In Tanzania, the net enrollment ratio
(NER)2 for youth aged 14-17 in Ordinary Levels was 36.6% in 2011, and just 2.7%
for youth aged 18-19 in Advanced Levels (Education Sector Development Committee
(2011)), while the dropout rate for youth enrolled in secondary schools was 9.3%.
Using panel data from the Tanzania Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
I find that for youth enrolled in school, exposure to crop shocks in the prior rainy
season reduces current school attendance and increases labor hours in unpaid farm
and non-farm activities. For youth not enrolled in school, such shocks increase hours
spent on wage employment dramatically, while decreasing participation in household
chores. Youth affected by crop shocks spend nearly double the number of hours en-
1Crop loss is measured if a household is affected by floods, droughts or diseases and pests, and
loses over 10% of the value of crops during the last growing season.
2NER = Enrolled children in the official school age group / Total number of children in the
official school age group
114
gaged in labor relative to children and are also significantly likely to miss school as
a result of such shocks, an impact not seen for children. Unlike primary schooling,
secondary schooling in Tanzania is not free. Fees and additional costs associated
with attending school are likely to cause households affected by crop shocks to keep
school attending youth out of school. School attending youth may also substitute for
household and farm labor of adults and youth not in school, who are more likely to
take up wage employment after such shocks. The value of youth labor after a crop
shock is expected to be higher than for households that do not face such shocks.
Results observed for children are not as dramatic as some recent papers on the
topic (Beegle et al. (2006)), potentially because our sample is nationally represen-
tative of agricultural households in Tanzania and does not focus on a particularly
poor region (Kagera)3. In addition, the difference could stem from the fact that a
larger share of households in our sample are unaffected by crop shocks compared to
Beegle et al. (2006) and a slightly smaller share of households lose over 50% of total
crop value. Nonetheless I find that crop shocks are a significant determinant of youth
outcomes, particularly youth in school, and it is important to find mechanisms that
could reduce this burden for agricultural households.
Youth and child labor are detrimental to the accumulation of formal academic
education, which may lead to lower long-term earning potential. However, for older
children or youth, access to vocational training or on-the-job training may increase
long-term earnings by providing more direct knowledge or ‘education’ of the job and
increasing job networks (Emerson and Souza (2011)). Emerson and Souza (2011) in-
vestigate whether child labor is harmful, and find that the impact of entering the
labor market on adult earnings is negative for young children but this negative effect
becomes positive for children aged 12 to 14.
3Our definition of shocks (see footnote 1) is very similar to Beegle et al. (2006). While
Beegle et al. (2006) take any magnitude of loss as an indicator of crop loss, I create a crop loss
indicator equal to one if the share of crop loss was over 10% of the total crop value, in order to make
our measure comparable to Beegle et al..
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Focusing specifically on youth in Tanzania, Kahyarara and Teal (2008) study
which forms of educational investments - vocational schooling, academic education
or on-the-job training - are profitable for increasing incomes. The authors find that
returns to education increase with the level of education for secondary school aged
youth, and are higher than that of vocational training or on-the-job training. In-
terruptions to youth education and increased labor due to crop shocks could reduce
educational attainment of youth by affecting performance. Though likely to happen
rarely, they could also reduce the likelihood that youth not in school return to school
if financial burdens were keeping youth out of school. Although this paper does
not examine the long-term implications of crop loss on youth, it shows that youth
schooling and labor outcomes are both affected.
To understand whether crop loss affecting youth labor and schooling reduce hu-
man capital formation in Tanzania, I refer to Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999).
Many youth and children in the Tanzania LSMS agricultural household sample who
go to school also work. Youth or child labor can reduce time devoted to study nega-
tively affecting schooling performance. If can also reduce time spent in school or lead
to dropouts. However, these impacts are only harmful from an economic perspective if
they contribute to a reduction in human capital formation. Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos
(1999) using time-log data from the Human Resource Development Survey (HRDS)
in Tanzania, find that hours of work for children tend to be negatively correlated with
development of reading and math skills both through hours worked and the indirectly
through the reduction of investment in human capital building activities. A study by
Beegle et al. (2007) considers the long-run consequences of child labor in Tanzania’s
Kagera region. Instrumenting for child labor with crop and rainfall shocks, the paper
causally associates labor with reduced educational attainment. As existing studies
focus on the impact of child labor, work on the long run impact of youth labor is
needed.
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In this paper I address the question of whether crop shocks affect labor and school-
ing. This question has already been examined for children but not for youth. In
addition, prior literature has not compared outcomes across youth and children.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Appendix 3.2 describes our
empirical approach. Appendix 3.3 presents our main empirical results, while Ap-
pendix 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
I investigate the effect of crop shocks for agricultural households on youth labor and
schooling outcomes, and compare youth outcomes to child outcomes. Specifically, I
use individual and household panel data from the Tanzania Living Standard Measure-
ment Survey (LSMS). There are two waves of the LSMS for 2008/09 and 2010/11 and
the LSMS is a nationally representative survey4. I focus on agricultural households
in the panel, with a positive plot area, comprising of 2284 households in the fist wave
and 2755 in the second wave5. Around 70% of agricultural households participate in
some agriculture. Attrition for the agricultural household sample at 1.7%. Although
attrition for most longitudinal surveys is a common problem, in this case attrition
for the LSMS sample is very low most likely as the gap between survey years very
small. There is no differential attrition between households affected by crop loss and
the unaffected.
If crop loss shocks are measured accurately and are not correlated with time-
variant factors that may also affect the outcomes of interest, I can recover causal
estimates of the effect of transitory crop shocks on youth labor by estimating the
4More technical information about the survey can be found in National Bureau of Statistics
(2009), National Bureau of Statistics (2011)
5Four hundred and seventy one original households’ were matched to more than one household
in the second wave
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following equation:
yit = β0 + β1Xijt + β2cropshockijt + γt + γt ∗ αd + ηj + εijt (3.1)
where i indexes individual, j household, d district and survey year (t = 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).
Dependent variable y is youth labor hours (or youth schooling - currently in school,
missed school in last 2 weeks - and labor hours broken down by activity), cropshock
is a indicator measure of income shocks. I denote by Xijt a vector of control vari-
ables including time-varying individual, household and community controls, and by
ηj household fixed effects. By including district-time fixed effects I purge any time-
district specific difference from the estimation. Household fixed effects are used to
control for time-invariant household and community characteristics, thereby making
the coefficient on cropshockijt a measure of an idiosyncratic shock.
To examine differences in effects of crop loss on youth versus children in the full
sample of youth and children, I follow the specification:
yit = β0 + β1Xijt + β2cropshockijt + β3cropshockijt ∗ childijt + β4childijt
+γt + αd + γt ∗ αd + ηj + εijt
(3.2)
where child is an index variable that is one if the individual is aged 7–13 and and
zero if aged 14–19. For this specification I am interested in observing coefficients β2
and β3, to compare differences between youth and children.
I investigate threats to identification, specifically plausibility of the exogeneity
and the transitory assumptions on nature of crop shocks. This follows closely the
work of Beegle et al. (2006) on child labor and shocks. Crop loss shocks could be
systematically correlated with characteristics of households’ such as wealth, land area
and several other factors, thereby violating the exogeneity assumption. To minimize
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such concerns, I use household fixed effects, survey year dummies, and some individual
and household controls, including mother and father in household, child age, and
household size. Exogeneity may also be violated if youth or child labor predicted
shocks. Using the second wave of the LSMS I examine the relationship between
lagged mean youth and child labor at the household level and crop shocks.
Shocks can be viewed as transitory if a household (not) experiencing a shock in
one period is no (less) more likely than other households to experience a shock in
a future period. I explore the exogeneity and transitory assumptions further in the
next section. In addition, the use of district, district-time and household fixed effects,
allow us to purge the data of time invariant district and household effects,in essence
reverting shocks to the household mean, and control for differences across district in
a given year. I do not examine this empirically through a regression specification, like
Beegle et al. (2006) because a large sample of the households experience no shock in
both periods making any correlation between past and current shocks automatically
significant.
3.2.1 Variable Measurement
3.2.1.1 Seasonal crop shocks
I measure crop loss values using the responses to questions in the household agricul-
tural module in each survey round. Losses are measured for the last long rainy season
- in which the majority of crops are planted - prior to the survey. I calculate the total
crop area planted and total crop area harvested. If the total crop area planted was
larger than the crop area harvested, I treat the value of crops for the harvested area,
given in the survey, as a proportion of the total potential value of planted crops. For
example, if 80% of planted land is harvested, I treat the value of harvested crop as
80% of the potential value. From this, I derive the value of crop loss and the share of
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total crop value lost. This is calculated if the area harvested was less than the area
planted reportedly due to droughts, rains, insects or disease. I consider this estimate
of the value of crop loss as more accurate than studies using respondent accounts of
crop loss value. I measure the effect of crop loss for households’ with any positive plot
area and for plot areas between 1 and 25.5 hectares following Beegle et al. (2006).
Tanzania is still highly agrarian and many agricultural households’ consistently
face risks to their income process Dercon (1996). For the purpose of this paper, I
create a seasonal crop shock dummy taking on a value of 1 if households’ face lose
more than 10% of the value of planted crops. I assume that losing over 10% of crop
value can be considered to have a significant impact on household income6. Values
lower than 10% may also be more subject to measurement error of the area planted
and harvested as these values would be reasonably close together. I demonstrate that
such shocks are both exogenous and transitory.
3.2.1.2 Labor and Schooling
I define child labor as total hours spent working on economic activities in the week
prior to the survey. Economic activities consist of unpaid farm labor, unpaid non-farm
labor on household businesses and wage employment. I also measure the disaggre-
gated impact of crop loss on participation in the different activities. Most youth aged
14-19 and children aged 7-137 allocate the majority of their labor time to unpaid la-
bor. A larger proportion of youth work in wage employment. I measure hours spent
on household chores, collecting firewood and fetching water, as a separate form of
labor, as responses are collected for participation in chores yesterday. Schooling out-
comes measured are currently enrolled in school and missed school in the last 2 weeks.
Conditional missed school is defined for only youth or children currently enrolled in
6Varying this cut-off at 15%, 20% and 25% does not change the results significantly.
7While many studies consider children as aged 7-15, I differentiate child and youth groups by
primary and secondary school age
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school. The unconditional measure of not being present in school in last 2 weeks is
denoted by 0 if in school and did not miss school, 1 if in school and missed school,
and 1 if not in school. I examine whether crop loss affects schooling enrollment, and
also look at its impact on labor allocation patterns for youth, separately by schooling
enrollment status.
3.2.1.3 Additional Controls
Other controls included in the estimation are youth or child age, father present in
household , mother present in household, household wealth quartiles, and household
size. Additionally I include district, year and household fixed effects and district-time
controls. Ownership of various durable assets, and other characteristics such as ma-
terial used to build the household are used to create a wealth score from Principal
Component Analysis (PCA). Households are categorized into quartiles as poor, mod-
erately poor, moderately wealthy and wealthiest, for the nationally representative
sample. The inclusion of these controls absorbs their direct impact on youth or child
labor and schooling, and ensures that the impact of crop shocks is not attenuated
by commonly associated time-varying omitted variables. I find that the inclusion of
these controls has very little effect on the significance, or size of the coefficients on
crop loss.
3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Appendix 3.5 and Table A.1 in Appendix 3.6 present summary statistics for youth
and children across sub-samples. This first sample considers all agricultural house-
holds with plot ownership. The second sample is a sub sample of the first constrained
to households with plots 1–25.5 acres. Focus on this subsample follows Beegle et al.
(2006) by excluding households with small crop areas and very large (commercial)
farms because the marginal impact of crop loss for these outlier groups may be dif-
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ferent from the remaining sample. The subsequent four columns present summary
statistics for the two groups, separately by individuals exposed to crop shocks and
those not exposed. For the full sample, on average youth worked close to 18 hours in
the prior week, with over 60% participating in some form of economic activity. Youth
spent a little over half an hour yesterday on household chores and roughly around
45% of youth engage in household chores. From Appendix 3.6, children worked ap-
proximately 7 hours in the prior week and 45% of children engaged in at least 1 hour
of economic activity in the last week. Children spent a little over 0.4 hrs on household
chores yesterday, with around 40% of children participating in some form of chores
in the prior day. From the two tables, youth work well over double the hours worked
by children, as expected. 85% of children in the sample are currently in school while
only around 50% of youth are enrolled.
From both tables, with the exception of work in economic activities and partic-
ipation in household chores, mean distribution across most covariates is similar for
households affected and unaffected by crop shocks. Over 85% of households in the
youth and child samples are rural. Household size for the youth and child sample
of agricultural households’ is large, with a mean close to 8. Parental education for
both the child and youth samples are low. For both groups, approximately 10% of
fathers’ and 5% of mothers’ have more than primary school education. Agricultural
household wealth, on average, is below the national representative survey mean.
3.2.2.1 Exogeneity and Transitory Assumptions
I next examine plausibility of the transitory and exogenous assumptions of the crop
shock variable for agricultural households. Appendix 3.5 Panel A shows the frequency
with which shocks occurred for the longitudinal LSMS panel. Over 20% of households
in the sample are affected by at least one shock over the two survey periods. In the
sample of 3846 households only 2.6% of households are affected by a shock in both
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periods. However, as shown in Appendix 3.5 panel B, the conditional probability of
experiencing a shock in the second period, having experienced one in the first is 20%.
On the other hand, the probability of experiencing a shock in the second period,
without experiencing one in the first period is 10%. The difference between the two
probabilities is statistically significant. However, the conditional probability in either
case is quite low. I conclude that the use of household and district-time fixed effects
should control for any time-invariant or location-time specific differences such that
shocks can be viewed as transitory in the LSMS sample.
Panel C, in Appendix 3.5, shows the share of the value of crop loss by number
of shocks experienced over the 2 year LSMS panel. For households experiencing one
shock during both surveys just over 30% of households lose over 50% of total crop
value, this suggests crop shocks have a large impact on income for a large proportion
of households. Of the 100 households facing shocks in both survey periods, over 20%
experienced losses over 50% in the first LSMS wave and over 30% lose over 50% of
total crop value in the second LSMS wave.
Appendix 3.5 presents the results from a simple OLS regression of crop loss shocks
in the second wave of the LSMS on lagged child and youth labor in the previous
period. Additional household controls are also included. Columns (1) and (2) provide
some evidence that lagged youth labor or lagged child labor from LSMS wave 1 do
not predict crop loss shocks in wave 2. Similarly, in column (3) it is clear that
households with a higher youth or child labor intensity are not significantly more
likely to experience shocks. Characteristics of the household head are not more likely
to predict shock occurrence, with the exception of household head age in column (2).
However, head age is only significant at the 90% level.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Crop Loss Impact on Youth Labor and Schooling
Appendix 3.5 presents the results from OLS regressions of crop loss shocks on youth
labor allocation. All specifications include time-varying child and household controls,
year dummies and household, district, district-year fixed effects. I find evidence of
a statistically significant positive relationship between crop shocks observed in the
last long rainy season prior to the survey and total labor hours spent on economic
activities for youth in the week prior to the survey. This suggests that the impacts of
crop shocks last beyond the growing season. Youth in agricultural households facing
crop loss spend on average 4 hours more on labor. However, crop loss in the prior
growing season has no impact on time spent on household chores for youth. From
columns (5) and (6) I observe that a crop loss shock is associated with 2.2 – 2.7
additional hours spent on unpaid farm labor, and from columns (7) and (8) 1.5 to
1.9 extra hours spent on unpaid non-farm labor. Crop shocks are not associated with
increased labor in wage employment for the full sample of youth (column (9) and
(10)). Other factors like youth age and gender affect the allocation of time to various
labor activities. On average female youth allocate less time to labor in economic
activities but more time on household chores, as expected. Differentiating by type
of economic activities, females are significantly more likely to spend time in unpaid
non-farm labor activities while males are more likely to engage in farm and wage
labor.
If as shown crop loss affects youth participation in household labor in the post
growing season, the underlying concern is that it would also affect youth schooling
outcomes. From Appendix 3.5 columns (1) and (2) I find that seasonal crop shocks
have no significant impact on the likelihood of schooling enrollment. However, the
unconditional likelihood of not being present in school (regardless of enrollment sta-
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tus) increases by 6–9% (columns (3) and (4)). On average, nearly 15% percent of all
youth report missing school in the last 2 weeks, while 26% of youth enrolled in school
report missing school. Estimates conditional on school enrollment in columns (5)
and (6) indicate that youth in school whose households are affected by crop loss are
more likely to have missed school in the last two weeks by 12.5–17.6% over youth in
unaffected households. The coefficient on crop loss when regressed on missed school
is larger for the sample with a plot between 1 and 25.5 acres. The results from
Appendix 3.5 and Appendix 3.5 are suggestive of a substitution effect between time
spent on labor activities and missed school for youth as a result of crop shocks, which
persists in the period following the growing season. The results on youth schooling
may also be related to the costs of secondary schooling. In addition to school fees,
students may be required to pay for uniforms, food and other materials. Hence, if
crop shocks increase household budget constraints youth school attendance for future
periods may be compromised.
3.3.2 Crop Loss Impact on Youth: By School Enrollment
Appendix 3.5 presents estimates on the effect of crop loss for youth by school en-
rollment status. A large proportion of secondary school aged youth in Tanzania are
not enrolled in school. In the sample of agricultural households approximately 50%
of youth are enrolled. Crop loss could have very different implications for youths’
activities depending on whether they are currently in school. For youth already al-
ready participating in the labor force, a significant rise in the participation in labor
activities as a result of crop loss may not raise as much concern as for youth who are
currently enrolled in school.
In Appendix 3.5 I find a larger coefficient on the effect of crop loss on total labor
for youth not enrolled in school compared to those enrolled. However, the difference
across the two groups is not statistically significant. As a result of crop loss those not
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enrolled observe a per week increase in labor of 6.187 (not statistically significant)
hours while those enrolled increase labor by 5.381 hours (significant at the 99% level).
When labor is broken into categories, both groups experience a significant increase
in participation in at least one type of labor, but the types of labor differ dramatically.
From the table, columns (4) and (6) indicate that youth in school increase unpaid
farm and non-farm labor by approximately 2.5 hours per week in each activity as
a result of crop loss. Furthermore, youth in school are predicted to spend nearly 1
additional hour in the last day on household chores (column (10)). I do not observe
similar increases for these types of labor for youth not in school. However, youth not
in school increase wage employment by 4.6 hours, (column (6)) while reducing time
spent on household chores in the last day by 0.7 hours. These results indicate that
when affected by a crop shock in the prior season, youth in school may substitute for
the paid labor taken up by others in the household. I find a statistically significant
increase in total household labor, and adult labor, with an increase in adult labor
in wage employment. Results for adults are not shown in tables here, but can be
provided. Because the impact of a crop shock may persist at least in the short term
after the shock, youth in school compensate by taking up unpaid labor and household
chores. Youth not in school may be more likely to seek out wage employment as a
result of shocks, similar to other adults, if the impact of crop shocks from the growing
season persist in the short to medium horizon.
3.3.3 Crop Loss Impact on Youth: By Gender
I assess the effects of crop loss on female and male youth independently to observe
gender differences in the distribution of youth labor. Female youth from households
not affected by crop loss work 16.9 hours per week, while male youth work 16.1 hours
per week. The difference is not statistically significant. Appendix 3.5 presents results
on youth labor allocation and schooling outcomes stratified by gender. The impact
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of crop loss on labor hours and schooling outcomes vary dramatically by gender.
Appendix 3.5 column (1) and (2) show that female youth in households affected by
crop shocks increase labor by a significant 7.6 hours per week, whereas under the
same circumstances, males increase labor by 1 hr per week and the increase is not
statistically significant. The coefficients on crop loss across males and females are
significantly different.
The difference in labor hours supplied by male and female youth in households
exposed to crop loss stems from a significant difference across the two groups in
participation in unpaid farm labor. I find that female youth spend nearly 6 hours
extra per week (column (4)) working on the farm if the household faces crop loss. On
the other hand, the effect of crop loss on unpaid farm labor is -0.36 hours per week
and insignificant for male youth, from column (2). The observed results for increased
farm labor across female youth occurs in the period following crop shocks in the last
long rainy season. This could indicate an increase in female farm labor in preparation
for the following growing season substituting for adult labor which is more likely to
be employed in wage labor as a result of the crop shock.
I find the results on differences in schooling across male and female youth in
households impacted by crop loss align with the results on labor. In particular,
although no impact is found on either male or female youth enrollment in schooling, I
find a significant impact of crop loss on female youth missing school in the last 2 weeks.
In Appendix 3.5 (columns (7) to (10)) I present results on the conditional probability
of missing school in the last 2 weeks and the unconditional likelihood of not being
present in school, disaggregated by gender. Conditional on enrollment, female youth
are 35% more likely to miss school when affected by crop shocks, unconditionally this
is 12%. Male youth are 11.7% more likely to miss school conditional on being enrolled,
however, the increase for males is not statistically significant and it is significantly
lower than the increase for female youth. Our results show a gender bias in the
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household allocation of labor and subsequent schooling outcomes for youth. That is,
I find that although female youth in unaffected areas tend to spend approximately
the same amount of time as male youth on labor, when agricultural households are
affected by crop loss females work disproportionately more. As a result, female youth
in school are less likely to attend school if the household face a crop shock in the prior
season.
3.3.4 Comparing Youth Outcomes to Child Outcomes
Existing literature shows a strong association between crop shocks and an increase in
child labor and a decline in educational enrollment for children. Our analysis concurs
with the first finding, though not the second (Appendix 3.6). Results from Table
A.2 Appendix 3.6 indicate that primary school aged children spend 1.4 to 1.8 hours
extra on labor activities as a result of crop shocks. This is nearly 3 hours less than
the increase observed for youth due to crop loss. With one exception, I do not find
significant differences in hours worked across children and youth for labor broken
down by type of activity. Column (3) measures the impact of crop loss on hours
worked per week in farm labor. In households affected by crop loss children work 1.3
hours significantly less than youth on farm labor. Table A.3 Appendix 3.6 does not
show any significant impact of crop loss on the likelihood of school attendance for
primary school aged children.
Appendix 3.5 compares the effect of crop shocks on children to that on youth.
From column (1) I find that children work 1 hour less than youth as a result of crop
loss, but the difference is not significant. This result is unexpected because if I assume
youth are more productive, particularly in agricultural activities, then I would expect
the marginal increase in labor as a result of crop loss to be significantly larger for
youth. Similarly, I do not find a difference in hours spent on household chores across
youth and children in households affected by crop shocks.
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Finally, I consider the differences in schooling outcomes across children and youth,
as a result of crop shocks. From Appendix 3.5 I do not find any differential impact on
school enrollment for youth or children experiencing crop shocks. Columns (7) and (8)
suggest however, that there is a significant difference in likelihood of missing school
or not being present in school between youth and children in households exposed to
crop shocks. The unconditional likelihood of not being present in school and the
conditional likelihood of missing school in the past 2 weeks is respectively 4% and 9%
lower for children relative to youth. Comparing child outcomes to youth outcomes
suggest that youth schooling may be more affected as a result of crop shocks. Youth
many be more likely to miss or be absent from school than children as a result of
past crop shocks because of the cost of education for youth. While primary school is
free in Tanzania, secondary school is not. Further, other costs associated with school
attendance like uniforms, and supplies are likely to be higher for youth than children.
After crop shocks, credit constrained households are more likely to lead to reduced
participation in school by youth potentially due to the higher opportunity cost of
attendance for this group.
3.4 Conclusion
The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines child labor as work that interferes
with schooling by depriving children of the opportunity to attend school, or obliging
children to leave school prematurely or requiring them to attempt to combine school
attendance with excessively long and heavy work. Youth labor could potentially
have similar implications as child labor on human capital accumulation, especially
for youth in school.
In this work, I have used plausibly exogenous and transitory crop shocks, caused
by droughts, flood, disease and pests, to estimate the causal impact of seasonal crop
loss on outcomes of youth in agricultural households. In addition I have compared
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youth outcomes to child outcomes. I find that youth labor allocation towards various
economic activities increases significantly when households are constrained by crop
loss in the prior growing season. I also find that youth are significantly more likely
to have missed school in the last 2 weeks if affected by crop loss in the last season.
I further find that there are differences in labor and schooling outcomes for youth
exposed to crop loss by gender. Female youth are disproportionately more likely to
engage in unpaid labor and miss school compared to male youth despite engaging in
similar levels of labor if not affected by crop loss. Further, I find marked differences in
the types of labor in which youth enrolled in school and those not enrolled in school
participate.
Prior literature has focused on the impact of crop loss and other shocks on child
labor. Hence, I compare differences across child and youth labor and schooling out-
comes as a result of crop loss. I find that while both children and youth increase
labor participation, relative to children youth increase labor by more as a result of
the shock. However, differences are only significant for unpaid farm labor. More
importantly, I find that while youth schooling outcomes are affected by shocks, child
schooling is not affected. These findings imply that crop loss is important in deter-
mining youth labor and schooling outcomes, and that youth schooling attendance is
more vulnerable to shocks than child schooling. Crop shocks are measured in the last
rainy season prior to the survey, while labor and schooling outcomes are observed for
the week before the survey. Hence, crop shocks may alter youth labor and school-
ing patterns in the short to medium term, as budget constrained households face
the post-harvest period. Further, youth schooling in Tanzania is not free and child
schooling is free, and additional costs associated with youth schooling are likely to
be higher than child schooling, creating a barrier to youth remaining in school. The
opportunity cost of labor for youth relative to children of attending school as opposed
to working is likely to increase after crop shocks.
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This paper demonstrates that while child labor and its causes and consequences
are clearly important from a policy perspective, we need to pay more attention to
youth outcomes as well. I cite earlier work by Kahyarara and Teal (2008) suggesting
that for youth in Tanzania returns to education are larger than returns to on-the-job
investments or vocational training. Further research is needed to establish the impact
of crop loss and other shocks on long-term outcomes, including earnings and labor
choices for youth in developing countries. This is of interest from a policy perspective
because youth schooling enrollment in many developing countries, including Tanzania,
tends to be very low. If shocks contribute to poor schooling outcomes for youth,
ways of insuring against such shocks to prevent negative outcomes for youth must be
developed
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3.5 Tables & Figures
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Table 1: Summary statistics: youth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Youth aged 14–19
Sample restriction: land acres (Ha) > 0 1– 25.5 1– 25.5 1– 25.5
Sample restriction: shock With shock No shock
Hours worked in economic activities
–last weeka
Mean 17.80 (21.60) 17.10 (21.50) 19.10 (21.60) 16.80 (21.40)
Proportion>0 0.64 (0.48) 0.62 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) 0.60 (0.49)
Hours on household chores–yesterday
Mean 0.51 (1.38) 0.53 (1.49) 0.58 (2.24) 0.52 (1.28)
Proportion>0 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Log value of crop loss
Mean 11.30 (1.73) 11.40 (1.55) 11.80 (1.44) 10.10 (1.16)
Proportion>0 0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Household wealth factor score -1.08 (2.37) -1.20 (2.28) -1.68 (1.76) -1.10 (2.36)
Household size 7.85 (4.40) 7.85 (3.81) 7.36 (3.37) 7.95 (3.90)
Rural 0.84 (0.37) 0.86 (0.35) 0.88 (0.32) 0.85 (0.35)
Individual currently in school 0.53 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Father’s schooling
No school 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
Some primary, 1–7 years of schooling 0.62 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48)
Some secondary, 8–13 years of schooling 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.29)
Higher than secondary 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.08)
Don’t know 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.21)
Mother’s schooling
No school 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47)
Some primary, 1–7 years of schooling 0.59 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47) 0.60 (0.49)
Some secondary, 8–13 years of schooling 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.15) 0.05 (0.23)
Higher than secondary 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.03)
Don’t know 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15)
Observations 3858 2804 488 2316
Notes: a– Economic activities refers to unpaid farm labor, unpaid non-farm labor and wage employment.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.10
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Table 2: Frequency and magnitude of shocks, agricultural households in LSMS survey
Panel A: Frequency of shocks





Panel B: Conditional probability of shock occurrence
Probability
Pr. of shock in period 2— no shock in period 1 0.10
Pr. of shock in period 2— shock in period 1 0.20
Pr. of no shock in period 2 — no shock period 1 0.90
Pr. of no shock in period 2 — no shock period 1 0.80
Panel B: Magnitude of shock by number of shocks across survey rounds
2 shocks, 2 shocks,
Share of the value of crop loss to total crop value 1 shock survey round 1* survey round 2*
10–25% 31.23 30.00 25.00
26–50% 37.39 47.00 42.00
51–75% 20.00 12.00 21.00
76–100% 11.37 11.00 12.00
Observations 730 100 100
Notes: * 2 shocks, survey round 1 denotes share of crop losses in 1st period if shocks in both survey rounds.
Similarly, 2 shocks, survey round 2 denotes share of crop losses in 2nd period if shocks in both survey rounds.
Table 3: Predicting occurrence of crop loss in LSMS wave 2
Crop loss in long-rainy period LSMS 2010/11
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged youth labor LSMS 2008/09 -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.001) (0.001)
Lagged child labor LSMS 2008/09 -0.0001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001)
Household head age 0.0015 0.0016* 0.0015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household head gender 0.0058 0.0059 0.0058
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Household head education -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,754 2,754 2,754
R-squared 0.009 0.006 0.010















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1: Summary statistics: child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child aged 7–13
Sample restriction: land acres (Ha) > 0 1– 25.5 1– 25.5 1– 25.5
Sample restriction: shock With shock No shock
Hours worked in economic activities
–last weeka
Mean 7.22 (12.40) 7.06 (12.60) 7.63 (12.90) 6.93 (12.60)
Proportion>0 0.46 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
Hours on household chores–yesterday
Mean 0.41 (1.69) 0.46 (1.79) 0.52 (3.05) 0.41 (1.37)
Proportion>0 0.39 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.46 (0.48) 0.41 (0.49)
Log value of crop loss
Mean 11.30 (1.67) 11.40 (1.59) 11.70 (1.53) 10.10 (1.12)
Proportion>0 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Household wealth factor score -1.40 (2.05) -1.55 (1.89) -1.86 (1.62) -1.48 (1.94)
Household size 7.71 (4.31) 7.67 (3.59) 7.23 (3.19) 7.76 (3.66)
Rural 0.86 (0.35) 0.89 (0.31) 0.91 (0.28) 0.88 (0.32)
Individual currently in school 0.85 (0.36) 0.85 (0.36) 0.85 (0.36) 0.85 (0.36)
Father’s schooling
No school 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38)
Some primary, 1–7 years of schooling 0.67 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) 0.69 (0.46)
Some secondary, 8–13 years of schooling 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.29)
Higher than secondary 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
Don’t know 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19)
Mother’s schooling
No school 0.312 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46)
Some primary, 1–7 years of schooling 0.606 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48)
Some secondary, 8–13 years of schooling 0.0575 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.14) 0.05 (0.21)
Higher than secondary 0.00188 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.05)
Don’t know 0.0224 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15)
Observations 5362 3977 714 3263
Notes: a –Economic activities refers to unpaid farm labor, unpaid non-farm labor and wage employment.
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